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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
Conference

List 17, Sheet 2

v.

Cert to CA 6 ~r-)
(Engel, Merri ~ Kennedy, Martin, in majority~
Edwards, Lively, Keith, Jones,
in dissent) "

UNITED STATES

Federal/Criminal

No. 82-15
OLIVER

1.

SUMMARY:

Timely

Petr contends that the

trine does not permit a warrantless search
field not visible from any
when the police had been

ace of public access, particularly
the property.

51-tJ -11

-r

2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

On July 18, 1980, the

Kentucky State Police received an anonymous telephone call informing them that marijuana was growing on petr's farm.

Without

obtaining a warrant, two plainclothes policemen went to the farm
that afternoon in an unmarked car to investigate.

Leaving the

public highway, they turned down a private, gravel road which
they knew to be petr's.

v'

Along this road they saw at least four

v'

"No Trespassing" signs, which they ignored.

After several hun-

dred yards they passed petr's house and the road narrowed.

With-

out stopping at the house to seek permission, they proceeded
along the road for another 3/4 of a mile until a locked, metal
gate, marked with a "No Trespassing" sign, blocked the road.
v
~
They saw the sign, which they ignored, but were unable to see any
contraband.

Leaving their car, they continued on foot through a

gap in the fence near the gate.

Several hundred yards beyond the

gate was a barn and a parked camper.

They looked around, but

they were still unable to see any contraband.

They proceeded for

another 1/4 of a mile along a curved, dirt path running through a
field and a wooded area when an unidentified man standing near
the camper shouted at

them,~elling

them to leave the property.

They returned to the camper, but found no one.

Resuming their

search, they continued along the path until they reached a secluded field located 1.4. miles from petr's house in which marijuana was growing.

This field could not be seen from the nearest

point of public access.
At petr's trial on charges of manufacturing marijuana,
·~

the DC (WD Ky~ Johnstone) followed Katz v. United States, 389

u.s.

347 (1967), and suppressed the evidence discovered during

the warrantless search.

The DC concluded that petr had asserted

his privacy interest in the field where the marijuana was discovered, this expectation of privacy was reasonable, and no exceptions to the warrant requirement applied.
On the government's interlocutory appeal, a CA6 panel
(Lively, Keith, Rice

[DJ))

affirmed.

The panel considered the

"open field" doctrine announced in Hester v. United States, 265

u.s.

57 (1924), but decided that the doctrine had been modified

by Katz.

In Katz, this Court observed that "the Fourth Amendment

protects people, not places."

389

u.s.,

at 351.

The test is not

whether an area is "constitutionally protected," but whether the
individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Applying

this test, the panel agreed with the DC that petr had a subjective expectation of privacy, and that this expectation was reasonable.
CA6 en bane reversed the panel in a 5-4 decision, holding that the Fourth Amendment does not protect an open field,
regardless of the owner's reasonable expectation of privacy.

The

majority held that Katz had not modified Hester for three reasons: (1) Katz involved circumstances that were not contemplated
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted (i.e., a public telephone
booth), while Hester involved a distinction "as old as the common
law" (i.e., between field and house); (2) the Katz Court noted
that the parties had agreed that an open field was beyond Fourth
Amendment protection, and Justice Harlan, concurring, continued
to treat the place as a relevant factor; and (3) since Katz, the

,.

Court has cited Hester "without indicating that its principle has
been diluted."

Finally, the majority rejected a suggestion that

the marijuana field was not an "open field" within the scope of
the rule, arguing that the distinction was between "open field"
and "curtilage."

Since the field was not part of the curtilage,

it was an "open field."
The principal dissent (Edwards, Lively, Keith, Jones)
objected to the adoption of a per se rule for all "open field"
cases.

The dissent first noted that the majority had misread

Hester, which merely permitted agents to trespass in an area from
which the public had not been excluded, and to view that which
was exposed to public view.
277

u.s.

born.

It was in Olmstead v. United States,

438 (1928), that the open field doctrine was really

There the Court held that a warrantless wiretap did not

violate' the Fourth Amendment because there was no "actual physical invasion of [the] house 'or curtilage' for the purpose of
making a seizure."

277

u.s.,

at 466.

In Katz, however, the me-

chanical application of the "constitutionally protected places"
analysis, on which both parties had relied, was rejected.

The

narrow holding of Hester remained valid: what a person knowingly
exposes to the public is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.

But when the public is excluded from an area, and the

object seized in the area is not exposed to public view, then the
Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test applies.
Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa, 416
and Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436

u.s.

u.s.

In Air
861 (1974),

307 (1978), for example,

the Court's analysis turned on the fact that the inspectors were

able to make their observations in places from which the public
had not been excluded.

Here the public was excluded from petr's

farm, so the Katz test should be applied.
Lively also filed a separate dissent, concluding that
the marijuana field was not an "open field" subject to the open
field exception.

He argued that an open field was one from which

the public had not been excluded.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr contends that the majority misap-

plied the open field doctrine, essentially for the reasons given
by the dissent.
The SG, while offering to file a response on the merits
if the Court requests one, has filed a memorandum in opposition
contending that the case is not ripe for review.

He argues that

this issue can be reviewed later if petr is convicted, but that
it will become moot if petr is acquitted.

He also argues that

there is no need to hold this case for Florida v. Brady, No. 811636, since petr will reap the benefit of a favorable decision
there if he is convicted and appeals.
4.

DISCUSSION:

This case clearly presents the question

whether there should be a "bright line" open field doctrine.

The

government did not contend that there were exigent circumstances
justifying the searchi it did not even claim that there was probable cause for the search.

The CA held that

~

search of an

open field (i.e., any area outside the curtilage) is permitted
under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the steps that an owner
has taken to secure his privacy or the steps that the government
must take to defeat this privacy.
r

The issue is essentially the same as that now before the
Court in Florida v. Brady, No. 81-1636, but in some ways this
case frames the issue more clearly.

In Brady the police were

seeking to intercept an airplane delivery, where the circumstances could be .a good deal more exigent, and that is not an
issue here.

Although the Brady entry onto the property was more

forcible (there was no property damage here--except to the marijuana) , the police were requested to leave the property in the
present case.
I am unconvinced by the SG's ripeness argument.
though the
view.

~peal

Al-

is interlocutory, this issue is ripe for re-

The factual record is well established, the issue is

clearly presented, and nothing can be expected to develop at trial to assist in the resolution of the open field question.

(It

is much more likely that extraneous issues, with which the Court
does not wish to deal, will develop.)

I am actually a little

surprised that the SG does not welcome the opportunity to argue
in Brady.

I would think that the Court could benefit from his

participation.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend CFR on the merits, with

an eye to consolidating with Florida v. Brady, No. 81-1636.
There is a memorandum in opposition dealing only with
the ripeness issue.
08/12/82
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
April 1, 1983 Conference
List 1, Sheet 2
No. 82-127 3
MAINE
v.

Cert to Maine Sup. Jud. Ct.
(per Carter)

THORNTON (4th Amend claimant)

State/Criminal

1.

SUMMARY:

Timely

rr-

The State claims erred in its determination

"

·~ did not justify a warrantless
that the ~en fields doctrine
search of a heavily wooded area of resp's property.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

An informant told police that

he had seen marijuana growing in back of a mobile home off Davis
Corner Road.

Two officers, without a search warrant, left the

Davis Corner Road, walked across the property between the mobile

home and an adjacent house until they reached an overgrown woods
road, used only as a footpath.

The officers continued up the

footpath until they found marijuana growing in two clearings
fenced with chicken wire.

The clearings were at least several

hundred feet from resp's house.

The officers then left the

property, and checked the town maps to "find out for sure" who
owned the property.

The officers then obtained a search warrant

and returned to seize the marijuana.
Resp, the owner of the property, was indicted for violations
of state drug laws.

After an evidentiary hearing, the trial

court suppressed the evidence.

The TC determined that resp "had

no intent to expose the enclosures to either public or police
view. The intent to avoid casual public view, and the efforts
taken to generally exclude the public from his wooded propety,
indicates the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy
thereon.

The officers were not innocently upon any property open

to the public (the footpath or tote raod was evidently not a
public way}, or in an area in which ownership of the land was
unknown.

Neither were the officers lawfully upon any neighboring

property when they discovered the marijuana; such a view was
impossible from adjacent land."
On appeal, the Maine SJC affirmed the suppression order.
The Court first rejected the State's claims that certain findings
of the TC were clearly erroneous.

Specifically, the SJC upheld

the findings that resp's property was posted with a number of
signs prohibiting trespassing and hunting, and that the officers
had to cross a stone wall in disrepair to get into the woods.

The SJC did find, however, it was possible to enter resp's
property without observing anything except the stone wall.
The SJC then determined that resp's conduct evidenced "a
clear expectation of privacy.

He chose a spot for the marijuana

patches that was observable only from his land: he posted No
Trespassing and No Hunting signs on his land: he generally
excluded the public from his land."
Finally, the SJC attempted to reconcile the open fields
doctrine of Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), and the
reasonable expectation of privacy approach of Katz v. United
States, 389

u.s.

347 (1967), by determining that "in Maine, for

the open fields doctrine to apply," the court must consider (1)
the openness with which the activity is pursued: and (2) the
lawfulness of the officers' presence during their observations.
Here, the State demonstrated neither requirement.

The defendant

"made every effort" to conceal his activity: nothing about his
enterprise was open or knowingly exposed to the public.

Second,

the officers were never legitimately on resps's property.

3.

CONTENTIONS:

The State notes that the open fields

doctrine is in a state of confusion.

This case presents a

virtually identical issue to Florida v. Brady, cert granted, No.
81-1636 (May 24,

1982)~

The case conflicts with the CA6 en bane

holding in Oliver v. United States, 686 F.2d 356 (CA6 1982), cert
granted, No. 82-15 (Jan. 24, 1983).
The resp contends that, even if Oliver correctly determined
that the search there was justified by the open fields doctrine,

~

...

-

4

-

the present case is distinguishable.

Here, the patches were only

150 feet from resp's house, whereas in Oliver the marijuana was
found a mile and a half from the defd't s house.

Further, the

area in Oliver was in fact "open" and a "field," whereas here the
area was heavily wooded.

Finally, in Oliver the expectation of

privacy was based largely on No Trespassing signs and a locked
gate.

Here, testimony indicated that resp had a reasonable

expectation of privacy beyond the signs and fences.

[Resp does

not spell out what other measures he finds significant.]

4. DISCUSSION:
Oliver.

This case is clearly at least a hold for

Although the case comes from a state court, there is no

hint of an independent state ground.

On the contrary, the heart

of the opinion analyzes Hester and Katz, and the opinion
concludes that unreasonable searches, such as this one, violates
the fourth amendment.
Perhaps, however, this case should be the one the Court uses
for argument.

The Court originally granted Florida v. Brady to

analyze the open fields doctrine.

A potential "standing" problem

arose in that the owner of the fields--i.e., the person with the
greatest expectation of privacy--was not before the Court.
Court then granted Oliver, and is holding Brady.
standing problem may exist in Oliver, however.

The

A similar
The SG's

supplemental memorandum in Oliver notes that the defendant there
disclaimed any personal interest in the part of the farm around
the gate, asserting that he leased the land behind the gate to
third parties.

Much of the dispute in Oliver concerns the

-

J

-

officer's actions in walking around the locked gate through a
small opening in the fence.
In this case, it seems clear that petr owns and controls all
the property at issue.
this case.

There should be no "standing" concerns in

I recommend granting this case and setting it for

argument instead of Oliver, No. 82-15.

Alternately, perhaps both

cases could be considered together.
There is a response.

March 23, 1983

Schwab
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·
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I. FACTS & DECISIONS BELOW

-

The facts of these two cases are set out aptly in the
briefs and are unimportant to the legal question presented here.
I will refer to the facts only as necessary to illustrate the
relevant legal principles.

The two decisions rendered below

illustrate the confusion over application of the 4th Amendment to
?
"open fields" @
adopted a per se approach in Oliver, holding
that the Fourth Amendment recognizes no privacy interests in an

open field,

the ~

in Thornton adopted a case-by-case

approach and held that the defendant in that case had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the woods behind his house
that was protected by the 4th Amendment. 1

This Court granted

cert. to resolve the conflict illustrated by these two decisions.
The Courts of Appeals and the state courts are all over the place
on the issue. 2

1 Respondent in Thornton argues that the judgment below rests on
an adequate and independent state ground because the state court
relied primarily on state cases in making its ruling. Resp. Br.
at 9-10 vThe argument is unpersuasive. The state court based its
decision squarely on this Court's decision in Katz v. United
States, 389 u.s. 347 (1967), and the protection provided by the
4th Amendment.
2 The Court has held three other cases pending decision in
Oliver and Thornton: Florida v. Brady, No. 81-1636 (4th Amendment
violated by government trespass on open field); United States v.
Dunn, No. 82-508 (4th Amendment violated by government trespass
in open curtilage of residence); Anderson v. Oklahoma, NO. 822030 (no 4th Amendment violation where government trespassed on
defendant's land to discover his marijuana field).

'·
'·.,
·•.

II. RELEVANT PRECEDENT

/~

The "open fields" doctrine originated in Justice

Holmes's two-and-a-half page opinion in Hester v. United States,
265 U.S. 57 (1924).

That opinion announced without explanation

that "the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to
the people in their 'person, houses, papers, and effects,' is not
extended to the open field." 265

u.s.

at 59

In that case,

revenue officers trespassed onto defendant's land and saw him
selling liquor to customers in front of his house.

Because the

incriminating evidence took place in an open field, it was not
protected by the 4th Amendment and not subject to the

T&aft~

exclusionary rule.

~

The Court re-affirmed the "open fields" doctrine in
passing reference in Olmstead v. United States, 277

(l~er

u.s.

than that passing approval, Olmstead is

unimportant to the issue presented here.

438~~

relatively ~

The Court held there

that taped phone conversations were not obtained in violation
the 4th Amendment where the wire taps were achieved

without

physical invasion of defendants' private property.
viKatz v. United States, 389

u.s.

347 (1967),

I~

J

o~

o~rruled

Olmstead and held that private phone conversations are entitled
to 4th Amendment protection even where there has been no
trespass.

---

In Katz, defendant entered a public phone booth that

was partly glass, closed the door, paid his toll, and placed his
call.

The Government eavesdropped on the call by means of an

electronic device placed on the outside of the booth.

•r,

This Court

'-(~~

~~

held that the evidence should be excluded under the 4th
Amendment.

.It

'-{~

It held that "the Fourth Amendment protects people,

not places," 389

u.s.

at 351, and noted that "' [t)he premise that

property interests control the right of the Government to search
and seize has been discredited.'" 389
v. Hayden, 387

u.s.

294, 304 (1967)

u.s.

at 353 (quoting Warden

(Brackets in Katz text).

Justice Harlan concurred and announced a two-prong test //~~
to determine when people may claim 4th Amendment protection:
"[F]irst .•. a person [must] have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, ••• the
expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize
as 'reasonable.'" 389

u.s.

at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).

Defendants argue correctly that Katz overruled the
strict "trespass doctrine" applied in Olmstead.

They also

correctly argue that the two-prong Katz test substitutes an
analysis that focuses on privacy expectations for one that
"'--=

focuses on property rights. 3

~

'-

....

However, it does not follow that

Katz precludes a per se rule declaring that open fields evoke no
privacy interests under the 4th Amendment.

To the contrary, such

a rule is arguably more consisten.t with Katz than an analysis
that focuses on property boundaries and no trespass signs.

3without specific reference to Katz, this Court relied on the
"open fields" doctrine in Air POliUtion Variance Board v. Western
Alfalfa, 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974), to hold that a field inspector
violates no legitimate privacy interests when he trespasses on
commercial property from which the public has not been excluded.

\

;•

III. DISCUSSION

Hester and Katz are consistent: both recognize that the
touchstone for 4th Amendment protection is not a person's
property interests, but his privacy interests.

See also United

States v. Knotts, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 1085 (1983): Smith v. Maryland,
442

u.s.

735, 740-41 (1979).

Police violate the 4th Amendment

when they intrude unreasonably on legitimate expectations of
privacy, whether these expectations be held on public or private
property.

If police make an unreasonable entry onto private

property, they may violate state trespass laws.

However, if

there are no legitimate expectations of privacy connected with
that private property, the police violate no constitutional
rights and the exclusionary rule generally will not apply.

-----

The question in this case is

------

wh~ther

privacy

expectations cognizable under the 4th Amendment ever exist in an
open field.

...

The Government argues for a per se rule answering

this question in the negative.

Defendants argue that legitimate

..___

expectations of privacy may exist in a field.

They argue that

the two-prong test announced in Justice Harlan's Katz concurrence
should be applied to each field to determine whether any such
privacy interests exist.

A. A Per Se Approach

I find this a close case, but on balance I believe that
the Government's per se rule is the wisest course.

.' ....

Justice

Holmes had no trouble reaching that conclusion in Hester.
Despite the trespass by revenue officers onto defendant's land,
he concluded quite simply that the 4th Amendment does not protect
any privacy interests in an open field.
59.

See Hester, 265

u.s.

at

The test that Justice ' arlan announced in Katz is not to the

-

contrary.

/f~

He agreed with the majority's statement that "'the

Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.'" 389

u.s.

at 361

~T
I

However, he observed that "[g) enerally, •.• the answer to that ~
question requires reference to a 'place.'" 389

u.s.

at 361

He

then announced his two-prong test, which I interpret as follows:
whether the person has shown subjective expectations
in that place; ~ ask whether it is reasonable to
4th Amendment protection to those expectations in that
The Government argues that this Court should adopt a

~

se rule that would answer this second prong and make the first
irrelevant: the 4th Amendment does not protect privacy interests
in a field.
The common sense rationale for this rule is that people

---

generally do not do extremely private things in a field.
generally do not live, sleep, eat, or dress in a field.

They
They

generally do not store their personal belongings or their private
papers in a field.

People of course may do as they wish with

their private property.

They may use their fields as places in

which to do all sorts of private things, and they may take lawful
efforts to exclude these things from public view.

However, if

they wish their privacy protected by the 4th Amendment, they must
move indoors.

,fi.. ,

This per se rule is consistent with this Court's

repeated interpretations of the second prong of the Katz test.
In Smith v. Maryland, 442 u.s. at 740, the Court explained that
"[c]onsistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that the
application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person
invoking its protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a
~
~----------------~
'reasonable,'
or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has

--

been invaded by government action."

See also Knotts, 103 s.ct.

at 1085: Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 150-53 {1978)

{POWELL,

J., concurring).

This per se rule is not as harsh as it seems at first
blush.

People may establish privacy interests in their fields

and protect them from public view and intrusion.

State trespass

laws are the primary source of such protection. Presumably, one
may seek protection from unlawful police entries onto one's
private fields by resorting to state trespass laws.

The per se

rule urged by the Government means only that the exclusionary
rule generally will not apply to suppress evidence seized from an
open field during an alleged trespass.
Moreover, a per se "open fields" rule would not open
everything found in a field to government intrusion.

Private

conversations held in a field that cannot be overheard with the
naked ear would be subject to 4th Amendment protection under the
Katz test.

Similarly, enclosed structures located in an open

field may be subject to 4th Amendment protection under the Katz
test.

For example, if a police officer is trespassing in an open

field, the per se rule announced here does not give him license
to peer inside a barn located in that field.

If there are

legitimate privacy interests in that barn, he must obtain a
warrant or identify exigent circumstances before peering inside.
In sum, I think that the per se rule urged here is the wisest
course.
Application of that rule even to the extreme facts of

~Brady

confirms its common sense.

In that case, police staked out

defendant's private airfield to determine

wh~plane

~-~-----

with marijuana was going to land and unload.

loaded

To get to their

/

observation post, the police ~d to cross a dike, ram through one
gate, cut the chain lock on another, and cut or cross several
posted fences.

Having done this, the police saw a plane land and

defendant and several others unload a shipment of marijuana.

The

state court applied the Katz test to hold that defendant had
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in the airfield to
which society was willing to give 4th Amendment protection.

50 cLc di~e.

3

I

A person's right to privacy under the 4th Amendment is

not co-extensive with his right to privacy under state trespass
laws.

The landing of a plane and the unloading of its cargo in

the out of doors is hardly the kind of innately private activity
that the 4th Amendment protects.

The police conduct here was

hardly commendable and probably violated a number of state laws.
However, because there were no legitimate privacy interests in
the defendant's activity in this place, the government intrusion
does not violate the 4th Amendment.

B. A Case-by-Case Approach

.·

'

'

..

There is an appealing argument against this per se rule.
However, I believe that it runs into problems in application.
Defendants argue that there is no reason to assume that there may
never be reasonable expectations of privacy in an open field.
They argue that before the Hester doctrine applies, each field
must be analyzed to determine whether it is an "open field"
within the meaning of that doctrine.
provides the proper test.

In their view, Katz

The first prong of the test is easy:

the field owner need only make known his subjective expectations
of privacy.

The second prong is more difficult: at what point

does the owner's efforts to secure his privacy interests give
rise to 4th Amendment protection?
The most justifiable and easily applicable rule under
this second prong would be the following: if the field owner
lawfully has secured the field from both public view and public

-

access, he has established an expectation of privacy protected by
the 4th Amendment.
from neighboring

I!_ the field is visible from public land, or ~·

land~there

under the 4th Amendment.

are no privacy interests

cogniz~le ~

This rule is consistent with the

noti ~

that what a person knowingly exposes to the public is not subject
to 4th Amendment protection.

If there are no 4th Amendment

interests in a particular field, it is constitutionally
insignificant that the police choose to view the field by
trespassing on the owner's land.

Protection from such government

intrusion may be forthcoming under the trespass laws but not
under the exclusionary rule.

There are several

proble~h ~pproach.

First,

assuming that the field is not visible from adjacent land, once
the owner manifests his subjective expectations of privacy by
posting no trespassing signs, what more must he do to secure 4th
Amendment protection?

A visible sign is sufficient to ensure

against intrusion under the trespass laws, but even defendants ao
not argue that this alone is sufficient to create 4th Amendment
protection.

Where along the spectrum from visible sign to

police-proof barrier does 4th Amendment protection attach?
Second, if only some parts of the field are visible from adjacent
land and others are not, is the field broken up into "open
fields" and "secured fields" according to visibility?

Third, the

Government in Oliver cites some state laws that give government
officials such as game wardens specific authority to enter
private posted lands to inspect for violations of state wildlife
laws.

See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.

Merrill repl. 1980 & 1982 Cum. Supp.)

§§

149.090, 150,090 (Bobbs-

If the 4th Amendment

protects open fields, I assume that such entries would be
unconstitutional without an administrative warrant.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
Barlow's Inc., 436

u.s. 523 (1967)

~

See, e.g.,

Marshall v.

u.s. 307 (1978).

Finally, and perhaps most problematic, is the test for
cognizable privacy interests, which asks whether the owner
legally has secured the field from public view.

---

Even the most

secluded field is visible from the air by the public and the

-

government alike.

.
Air surveillance generally does not constitute

trespass as long as the aircraft 1s not flown too low. See, e . . ,

United States v. Causby, 328

u.s. 256 (1946) (flight by aircraft

in air space above private property is trespass only if it enters
the "immediate reaches" of the property and interferes with the
owner's use of the
1380-81 (CA9 1980)

land)~

United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373,

(helicopter surveillance of private property

that could be seen only from the air is not a 4th Amendment
violation)~

Restatement (Second) Torts §159 (2)

500 feet are not within "immediate
feet are).

reaches"~

(flights above

flights within 50

The fact that open fields, unlike houses, barns, or

factories, are visible from the air suggests that the more common
sense approach would be a per se rule that there are no
legitimate expectations of privacy in an open field.

To hold

otherwise merely would drive government surveillance to the skies
and encourage a potentially more obnoxious kind of intrusion.

C. Standing Question

The Government in Oliver arguably presents a standing
question.

It argues that because Oliver had leased the field in

question to others, he has no right to assert whatever 4th
Amendment rights might exist in that field.

This Court has

indicated that "standing" questions under the 4th Amendment shall
be considered as part of the substantive question whether a
particular individual had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the area searched. Rakas v. Illinois, 439

u.s. 128

(1978)

If

the Court adopts the per se rule that there are no 4th Amendment
interests in an open field, resolution of this question with

respect to Oliver will be unnecessary.

If it does not, I think

that the Government's "standing" argument is flawed.
If, as the Government claims, the marijuana crop was
Oliver's, and he maintained the field, the trespass signs, the
gate, etc., I believe that he retained a sufficient privacy stake
in the field to assert whatever 4th Amendment interests existed.
The fact that Oliver gave the keys to the field gate to another
does not open the field to government intrusion.

If the police

had been invitees of Oliver's lessees, this would be a different
matter.

But such is not the case.

D. Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity

The Government in Oliver argues that if this Court
rejects the per se rule discussed above, it should apply a lesser
standard of cause that will allow police to make warrantless
entries onto private fields once they have a reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity.

Under this scheme, the police first must

determine whether the owner of the field has manifested privacy
expectations in the field that are protected by the 4th
Amendement.

If he has, they must determine whether there is a

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justifies
government intrusion.

The rationale supporting this lesser

standard of cause is another per se rule: even the most private
fields are never as deserving of 4th Amendment protection as are
houses, offices, barns, etc.

Althought this per se rule is

appealing for the same reasons as the first, it does little to

clear up the confusion concerning application of the 4th
Amendment to open fields.

This scheme still requires a difficult

analysis to determine whether 4th Amendment interests exist in a
particular field.

If the answer to that question is yes, then

those interests are treated as a special class of interests
requiring only reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause
and dispensing with the warrant requirement.

Such a result will

only contribute to the already needless complexity of 4th
Amendment law.

E. Curtilage Area

Despite the benefit of avoiding complexity in 4th
Amendment law, I believe that the open curtilage of a residence
is distinguishable from an open field for purposes of 4th
Amendment analysis.

Curtilage, as used here, is an area

immediately surrounding the house that is used for family

---

purposes.

Because of its common law connection with the home,

the Courts of Appeal have held that this area is imbued with
expectations of privacy protected by the 4th Amendment.

See,

e.g., United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992, 993 (CA4 1981);
United States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451, 453 (CAS), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 972 (1979).

The curtilage area often is open to public

view so that the expectations of privacy may not be great in any
given instance.

I believe that the Katz test should be applied ?

to each case involving this area to determine whether the
particular government intrusion violated any legitimate

~

~~~-~

------

----------~-----~

expectations of privacy.

CA4 adopted a similar approach in Van

Dyke, 643 F.2d at 994 (Butzner, J.).

'

\

"
Under the Katz test, the open
curtilage area in a
particular case may be protected by the 4th Amendment from
physical intrusion by police.

This may be so even if the police

can see the open area from the outside.

The only justification

for this is the historic association of this area with the home.
This association suggests that there may be other privacy
interests, closely related to privacy interests in the home, that
may be intruded on by government trespass.

This is roughly

analogous to viewing a marijuana plant in the window of a home:
although criminal evidence is in plain view from an unprotected
area, the police cannot trespass in the home to view the evidenc
more closely or to seize it.

However, they may use what appears

in plain view to establish the probable cause necessary to secur
a warrant.

The same does not hold true for an open field that

lies beyond the curtilage of a residence.

This is so because

open fields generally have no connection with privacy interests
that are likely to exist in the home.

~ ~

v

The decision in United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093
(CAS 1982) , which is being held for the decision in these two
cases (No. 82-508), is explicable under the distinction between
curtilage and open fields.

In Dunn, defendants were

manufacturing drugs on a 198 acre ranch.

The entire ranch was

surrounded by a perimeter fence.

-----------

There were interior fences,

including one around the house and one around a nearby barn.
Police penetrated both the perimeter fence and the interior

, •• ,.. 'l,,

~

~

fences around the house and barn.

During this trespass, they

placed surveillance equipment in the driveway within the interior
fences, and they looked inside the nearby barn.
the

ar~a

CAS found that

within the interior fences was within the curtilage

area, that privacy interests in that area were protected under
~

the 4th Amendment, and that the evidence obtained by trespassing

on this area was obtained in violation of that amendment and
should be excluded.

CAS applied the Katz test to determine that

the curtilage area was protected by the 4th Amendment, and its
decision in that case appears reasonable.

IV. CONCLUSION

I recommend that the Court adopt a per se rule that
there are no legitimate privacy interests in an open field that
lies beyond the curtilage area of a residence.

This rule accords

with this Court's repeated statements that the 4th Amendment
protects only those privacy interests that are reasonably and
justifiably held.
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lfp/ss 11/26/83
MEMORANDUM
TO:

David

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

Nov. 28, 1983

82-15 Oliver v. United States
82-1273 Maine v. Thornton
Over the holidays,
some care the first draft
two cases.

I

found

time to review with

(11/23) of our opinion in these

I am quite pleased with the draft.
I have made changes - chiefly editorial ones -

throughout the draft, and asked an occasional question.

I

think the basic organization and structure of the opinion
is consistent with my views and those of a majority of the
Court.
I
think

do want

should

be

you

Part

to take a close

III

first full paragraph on p.

(p.

20),

look

at what

commencing

I

with

the

22 down to Part IV on p.

25.

In these pages, you distinguish the no trespassing law of
property from the privacy right guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment.

It is necessary to make this distinction, and

you do so very well impression,

.f. .•

however,

particularly on pages 20,
is

that

Part

III

would

21.
be

My
more

2.

ef feet i ve

if

distinction
necessary

it

were

addressed

a

couple

is

an

to explain why.

of

pages

obvious

shorter.

one,

but

The
it

is

Please try to summarize what

you now have in pages 22-25.

Some of what is now in the

text can be retained in one or more footnotes.
As you will remember, the procedure from now on
is as follows:

I would like to see your revision of Part

III and any subsequent changes
remainder of the draft.

that you may make in the

It would facilitate my looking at

these if the changes were marked in the margin.
draft should go to your
function

generally

of

Then, the

"editor" who should perform the
an

officer

a

good

law

review.

Again, if substantive changes are made I would like to see
them.

If,

however,

you and your editor

editorial changes only are proposed,
should

reconcile these and have the

print shop downstairs do a first chambers draft.

Copies

of this should go to all four of the clerks as well as to
me.

I wi 11 let you know promptly whether I have changes

in the printed chambers draft,

and we proceed from there

to a "first draft" for circulation.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

'.t..~~-.:11""

dac 12/07/83

'~{.J.h_

To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

David

Re:

Justice O'Connor's Memorandum on Oliver v. US, No. 82-15

1.

'~"1~
I

I do not think that Justice O'Connor' p first sugges1

tion would clarify the opinion.

l

.

·~

I

Apparently she wishes to empha-

'

size that a polic~ search of an area is not a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment unless that search invades legitimate expectations of privacy.
This point is important when considering whether the
Fourth Amendment applies to a police investigatory procedure
which is not obviously a "search" in the common use of the term
- procedures such as wiretapping,
U.S. 347 (1967)

~

~Katz

v. United States, 389

a "canine sniff" of luggage,

v. Place, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2644-2645 (1983)
O'CONNOR), or chemical testing of cocaine,
Jacobsen, No. 82-1167.

~United

States

(per JUSTICE
~,

United States v.

The Court may decide that such procedures

are not "searches" because they intrude upon no legitimate expectation of privacy.
It seems less helpful to state that search of an open

---

field is not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

p~

~

ins~~~ for marijuana, they are not ~~ucting a

~ earc~."

~A~ated
I'-~"

~

\

Most citizens would be surprised to learn that when police

Rather, the question in Oliver is more simply formu-

to be whether the search of open fields is reasonable al-

.

though conducted without a warrant.

2p~-./

j ~

page 2.

If such a search is always reasonable because no legitimate privacy interests are invaded, perhaps it is in effect not a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

However, I

do not see how this latter formulation clarifies analysis of the
case.

While legal use of terms sometimes diverges widely from

ordinary usage, I do not think that a donstitutional ter~ such as
1

"search"
_____, should be turned into technical formula when the common
understanding of the word serves equally well.
2.

To incorporate Justice O'Connor's second suggestion,

footnote 10 might be revised to read:

" •.. and we have occasion

here to consider neither the scope of this doctrine nor the degree of protection afforded the curtilage, as opposed to the horne
itself, by the Fourth Amendment."

'.t

,jltJlrtutt <!flttt.d ltf tfrt 'Jlnittb ,jt:dts

11htsfrittgLm. ~. <!f. 2ll.;t~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

December 7, 1983

Re:

Nos. 82-15 and 1273-0liver v. U.S., et al

Dear Lewis:
"In due course" I will circulate a dissent.
Sincerely,

C(lt 1 .
T.M.

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

.h;tt.mtt <qGurl Gf f4t~b _jtatt_s
'JJulfin¢~ ~.

<q.

2llgt,.~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR.

December 7 , 198 3

Nos. 82-15 & 82-1273
Oliver v . United States
& Maine v . Thornton

Dear Lewis ,
I will await the dissent .
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

/

;iupum~

aflturlltf f4~ ~nit~~ ~tattg

..-ultittghm. ~. <!f.

2llgt'!~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

/
December 8, 1983

Re:

82-15 - Oliver v. United States
82-1273 - Maine v. Thornton

Dear Lewis:
I will wait for Thurgood's dissent.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

lfp/ss 12/08/83

OCON SALLY-POW
Open Fields Cases

Dear Sandra:
Since we spoke briefly yesterday, I have read
with some care your letter of December 7.

As always, I am

grateful to you for a private communication on a draft
opinion.

I recall last Term how helpful your suggestions

were in Dirks.
I do have some reservations that I share with
you as to the possible changes you asked me consider in
this case.

Your thought for a change in the first two

sentences of page 5 is, as I understand it, that some
police investigatory procedures are not a "search" in the
common understanding of that term, procedures such as
wiretapping, "canine sniffing" and chemical testing of

. 'A
'I•

2.

cocaine.

In such cases, we decide that they are not

"searches" because they intrude upon no legitimate
expectation of privacy.

I have thought that when police

inspect a field looking for marijuana, they are conducting
a search.

Thus, if my understanding is correct, the

question in Oliver simply is whether an open field search
is reasonable although conducted without a warrant.

December 12, 1983

82-15 Oliver v. United States
82-1273 Maine v. Thornton

Dear Thurgood:
Since you expect to write a nissent in these
cases, I want you to know that ! may make a number of
chanqes in my first draft.
T hope to

~ecirculate

somPtime this week.

Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
lfp/ss

'.

~ttpt'ttttt <!J~ttri ~f Urt ~tb .fbdts

-asJrittgtott. ~. <!J. 20.?'!$
CHAMBERS OF

..JU STI CE WI L LIAM H . R EH N QU IST

December 16, 1983

Re:

Nos. 82-15 & 82-1273

Oliver v. United States

Dear Lewis:
You would make me happy enough to join your opinion in
this case if you could adopt the following suggestions.
Each is premised on the idea that the "reasonableness" of
someone's expectation of privacy goes to the issue of
whether or not there was a search at all, as opposed to the
"reasonableness" of a search or seizure under the Fourth
Amendment, which depends upon whether probable cause exists
or whether a warrant is required.
On page 5 could you delete the second sentence, which
deals with warrantless searches, rather than with the
question of whether a particular governmental intrusion is a
search at all?
On page 10, in the sentence beginning on the third line
of the page, substitute for the phrase "warrantless search,"
the phrase "a governmental intrusion."
On page 10, in the first sentence of the first full
paragraph on the page, substitute for the phrase "nor is
search of a field ' unreasonable'" , the phrase "nor is a
governmental intrusion a ' search. ' "
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

December 20, 1983

United States

Here is a substantially revised c'iraf.t of. my open
fields opinion.
I have restructured it with the view to obtaining
your join, at least for parts of it. I am grateful to vou
for makinq me focus more sharnlv on the lan~uaqe of the
Amendment itsPlf. I do think it dPairablP to show that developments in the law of Fourth Amen1ment doctrine are consistent w'th both the lanquaqe and the intent of the
Founders.

Mv thanks to vou for vour ascsistance.
Sincerelv,

White

'·'

,

'

,•

..
•:

December 20, 1983

82-15 Oliver v. United States
81-1273 Maine v. ~hornton

Dear Sandra:
In view of your suggestions, and some conversation
both with Bill Rehnquist and Byron, I have made substantial
revisions particularly in the structure of my opinion in
these two cases. The purpose primarilY was to place qreater
emphasis on the language of the Fourth Amendment it~elf.
In the process, I have tried to incorporate your helpful
suggestions.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss

.._______,. . .

.,..~"---------:4'-.~---~-·-·----~---------~-~.--

·~ ,•·~·

~u.prtmt

<!fouri d tlt't 'J'ni.ttb ~tatt.s

jla.s!rittgton. ~. <!f. 2ll&fJ!~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

I

December 20, 1983
Re:

Nos. 82-15 & 82-1273

Oliver v. United States

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

r

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

,juvrtntt <ijMtrt cf tqt ~ittb ,jtatt.s'~lhudrhtgton, ~.

<If.

2llbf~~

CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

December 21, 1933

No. 82-15 Oliver v. United States
No. 82-1273 Maine v. Thornton

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

.§uvrttttt <!}ourlo-f tqt ~ttittb ~httts
'~llhtsltitt¢cn. ~. <!}. 2llp'!.;l
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

December 21, 1983

/
Re:

No. 82-15 - Oliver v. United States
No. 82-1273 - Maine v. Thornton

Dear Lewis:
I am, of course, still with you as to the result in
these cases.
I have concluded, however, that I shall
wait to see what the forthcoming dissent has to say
before I cast my final vote.
Sincerely,

~l
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Justice Powell
cc: The Conference
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December 29 1 1983

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

Re:

Oliver and Thornton

Dear Lewis,
I join in Parts I and II of your draft op1n1on in
these cases.
These Parts dispose of the issue before us,
and it seems to me that there is no need to deal with the
expectation of privacy matter.
However
reasonable
a
landowner's expectations of privacy may be, I doubt that
those expectations could convert a field into a "house" or
an "effect."
Furthermore, if privacy expectations are
determinative, where a landowner
takes steps to keep
intruders off his property sufficient to make entry a
criminal trespass and hence to invoke the ultimate sanction
of the local law, I would have some difficulty saying that
his expectations of privacy are not reasonably founded.
I
shall write a few words along this line.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc:

,, ~ It

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

December 30, 1983

RE:

82-15} - Oliver v. United States
81-1273} - Maine v. Thornton

Dear Lew is:
I join.
Regards,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE Wt< . ..J . BRENNAN, .JR.

March 26, 198 4

No. 82-15

) Oliver v. United
) States
)

No. 82-1273) Maine v. Thornton

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.
Sincerely,
/'

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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CHA ... ISI!:RS 0,-

..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 26, 1984

Re:

82-15 - Oliver v. United States
82-1273 - Maine v. Thornton

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

)JL

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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FIELDS SALLY-POW
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

David

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

March 27, 1984

82-15 and 82-1273 Open Fields Case
At horne last tonight
TM's

dissent

There

is,

before

(Monday) ,
Much

retiring.

however,

some

I

of

substance

took a look at
it

and

is
a

juvenile.
reply

is

indicated.
Without making any attempt to outline a reply, I
merely comment on what is said by TM as one reads through
his opinion:
1.

Our opinion is characterized as "startling"

although it relies primarily on Hester, written by Holmes
in 1924, and not since discredited.

Indeed, Hester is not

mentioned until p. 10 of the dissent, and then the effort
to distinguish it is based purely on speculation.
2.

It

"inconsistent"
cited
held

is
a

Katz
- - with

"telephone

Arnendrnen t" •

, .Jr ~-.

~

with

p.

2.

previous
a

that

said

is

comment

booth"
Yet,

our

decisions.
suggesting

to be

protected

decision

is

The

first

that

the Court

by

the

one

Fourth

as we noted, and as the dissent

2.

finally

says on p.

4,

only

the conversation of a person

was protected - not his presence in the booth.
The

dissent

refers

to

the

automobile

though its purpose is not entirely clear.
h as

•
anyt h 1ng

pro t ec t e d

everything

that

has

t h at
been

None of these

~~II pla1n
'

was~n

protected

cases,

'
II
v1ew
,

fairly

could

and

be

considered an "effect" of a person.
3.

as

it

is

Finally,

Part II of the dissent has more substance,

based

on

in Part III,

the

"positive

law"

of

trespass.

the

"rule" proposed by the dissent

is:
"Private land marked in a fashion sufficient to
render entry thereon a criminal trespass under
the law of the state •
• is protected by the
Fourth Amendment". p. 12
Our opinion correctly states

that

the

trespass

laws are designed primarily to protect economic interests.
The

dissent

holds

that

seizure"

cites
the

cases,

protection

contemplated

English common law,
laws.

no

by

English

against

the

Fourth

was based on or

or

American,

unlawful

"search and

Amendment,
related

that

and

the

to trespass

Also, David, I am not at all sure that our trespass

laws require - as the dissent suggests - any specific kind

3.

0~~(,
of fencing or posting.

You might take a look

~ ~~......,~
"'1 . .c:...c ···~ 4- ....-<...

laws in Kentucky and Maine.
As

Katz

said,

the

Fourth

.~
.......
~'~
in their homes,

offices,

It

protect

people

A
automobiles.

does

not

primarily

and

even

"places"

protects
in

their

apart

from

people.
It is interesting to look at the examples cited
in the dissent as to "privacy" uses of open forests and
fields that it says should be protected:
lovers",

,.~" endeavor"
David,

gather
and

"solitary

The

basis.

~businesses",
....

take

engage

"worship",

walks".

in

Refer

"creative
to

these,

to illustrate the reaching of the dissent for some

privacy

-

for

places to "meet

dissent

mention

"agricultural

and trespass laws no doubt were intended to

prevent the stealing

o~~

Historically,
designed

does

to

prevent

;.:;)

trespass
poachers

laws
and

primarily

were

hunters.

This

particularly true in England where hunting or poaching
believe whether
jail sentence.

the

land

is

posted

or

not)

is
(I

may bring a

Trespass laws also are intended to protect

forest land from fires, from property being "trashed", and
to

prevent

the

cutting

or

trees

or

the

gathering

of

4.

firewood,

etc.

Trespass

laws

simply

protect

interests

diffferentfrom the privacy of one's person and effects.
It is curious that the dissent should say that
its rule

is one easily understood and enforced,

ours will open the flood gates to litigation.
the

dissent

was

written

by

a

"city

boy

or

whereas

Apparently
girl".

It

ignores the variations as to the size, shape and location
of

land

Fairfax

ownership.
enjoyed

a

It

is

grant

an

from

historic
the

Revolution, of millions of acres.

fact

Queen,

that

prior

to

Lord
the

There are many private

holdings in this country today of tens of thousands - and
even hundreds of thousands of acres.

It would be absurd

to recognize a privacy interest in all acreage to enable
lovers to meet, and the conducting of outdoor worship.
And despite the length of this memo, David, limit
our. response to basic weaknesses of the dissent, and do so
with brevity.

L.F.P., Jr.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE H A RRY A . B L ACKMUN

April 2, 1984

Re: No. 82-15 - Oliver v. United States
No. 82-1273 - Maine v. Thornton
Dear Lewis:
Please join me.

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

...

.

82-82 Oliver v. United States
82-1273 Maine v. Thornton

~

,...c~~PJ::t.

~~~d..,e~

Ai he •open fields• doctrine, ~ enunciated in 1924 in

Hester v. United States, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes.
It permits police officer , lto enter and search a field or wooded
areas /without a warrant.

We granted certio~ri in these two

cases to clarify confusioj lthat has arisen as to Hester's
continued vitality.
In both casesJ'police seized marijuana that was being
cultivated in areas well beyond the residences of the defendants:
in

Oliv;r~i~~d,

and in

Thornton~n

woods.

The growing of marijuana was not visible from public
roads, and defendants had made extensive use of •no trespassing•
signs and fences.

They claimed a •legitimate expectation of

privacy• in these areas.
The open / fields doctrine { ests upon the explicit
language of the Fourth Amendment.

Mr. Justice Holmes said:

•The special protection accorded by the Fourth
Aaendmen;/to the people in their 'persons,
houses, papers and effects•,j is not extended to
open fields.

This distinction • • • is as old

as the common law•_:]

~~~eaffirw

"

-

the decision in Bester, and reject

the argument that there is a •legitimate expectation of privacy~
that would require a warrant to

~~/

enter~ and

seize evidence of

criae.
Laws against trespass on private property ~relied upon
in these cases;iserve entirely different interests:

they protect

legitimate property interests in crops, growing timber,
livestock, game and the like.
Accordingly, we affim the judgment of the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in

Oliyer~and reverse the judgment of the

Supreme Court of Maine in Thornton.
Justice White concurs only in in Parts I and II of the
Court's opinion.
Justice Marshall has filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Justices Brennan and Stevens have joined.

~ustice

While 2r

has filed-at\ opinJ Oft 8GR8Yl'Nft4J -iA-pMt and iR the "iYdfJJBenty

&82-15 Oliver v. United States (David)#
LFP for the Court 11/14/83
1st draft 12/6/83
2nd draft 12/20/83
3rd draft 4/6/84
Joined by WHR 12/20/83
Joined by SOC 12/21/82
BRW joins Parts I and II 12/29/83
Joined by CJ 12/30/83
Joined by HAB 4/2/84
BRW concurring in part and in the judgment 4/10/84
1st draft 4/10/84
TM dissenting
1st draft 3/23/84
2nd draft 4/13/84
Joined by JPS
Joined by WJB
BRW will write a few words 12/29/83
TM will dissent 12/8/83
JPS awaiting dissent 12/8/83
HAB waiting to see dissent 12/21/83
Copy to Mr. Lind 4/2/84

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

11/30

From:

Justice Powell
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-15

RAY E. OLIVER, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[December - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The "open fields" doctrine, first enunciated by this Court in
Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 (1924), pennits police
officers to enter and search a field without a warrant. We
granted certiorari in these cases to clarify confusion that has
arisen as to the continued vitality of the doctrine.
I
No. 82-15. Acting on reports that marijuana was being
raised on the farm of petitioner Oliver, two narcotics agents
of the Kentucky State Police went to the farm to investigate. 1 Arriving at the farm, they drove past petitioner's
house to a locked gate with a "No Trespassing" sign. A footpath led around one side of the gate. The agents walked
around the gate and along the road for several hundred
yards, passing a barn and a parked camper. At that point,
someone standing in front of the camper shouted, "No hunting is allowed, come back here." The officers shouted back
that they were Kentucky State Police officers, but found no
one when they returned to the camper. The officers resumed their investigation of the farm and found a field of
marijuana over a mile from petitioner's home.
' It is conceded that the police did not have a warrant authorizing the
search, that there was no probable cause for the search and that no exception to the warrant requirement is applicable.
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Petitioner was arrested anq indicted for "manufactur[ing]"
a "controlled substance." 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1). After a
pretrial hearing, the District Court suppressed evidence of
the discovery of the marijuana fields. Applying Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967), the court found that
petitioner had a reasonable expectation that the fields would
remain private because petitioner "had done all that could be
expected of him to assert his privacy in the area of farm that
was searched." He had posted "no trespassing" signs at regular intervals and had locked the gate to the entrance of the
farm's center. Pet. App., at 2~24. Further, the court
noted that the fields themselves are highly secluded: they are
bounded on all sides by woods, fences and embankments and
cannot be seen from any point of public access. The court
concluded that this was not an "open" field that invited casual
intrusion.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en bane,
reversed the district court. 686 F. 2d 356 (1982). 2 The
court concluded that Katz, upon which the District Court relied, had not impaired the vitality of the open fields doctrine
of Hester. Rather, the open fields doctrine was entirely
compatible with Katz's emphasis on privacy. The court reasoned that the "human relations that create the need for privacy do not ordinarily take place" in open fields, and that the
property owner's common law right to exclude trespassers is
insufficiently linked to privacy to warrant the Fourth
Amendment's protection. Id., at 360. 3 We granted certiorari. U. S. (1983).
A panel of the Sixth Circuit had affirmed the suppression order. 657 F.
2d 85 (1981).
3
The four dissenting judges contended that the open fields doctrine did
not apply where, as in this case, "reasonable efforts have been made to exclude the public." 686 F. 2d, at 372. To that extent, the dissent considered that Katz v. United States , supra, implicitly had overruled previous
holdings of this Court. The dissent then concluded that petitioner had established a "reasonable expectaton of privacy" under the Katz standard.
2
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No. 82-1273. After receiving an anonymous tip that marijuana was being grown in the woods behind respondent
Thornton's residence, two police officers entered the woods
by a path between this residence and a neighboring house.
They followed a footpath through the woods until they
reached two marijuana patches fenced With chicken wire.
Later, the officers determined that the patches were on the
property of respondent, obtained a warrant to search the
property and seized the marijuana. On the basis of this evidence, respondent was arrested and indicted.
The trial court granted respondent's motion to suppress
the fruits of the second search. The warrant for this search
was premised on information that the police had obtained
during their previous warrantless search, that the court
found to be unreasonable. 4 "No Trespassing" signs and the
secluded location of the marijuana patches evinced a reasonable expectation of privacy. Therefore, the "open fields"
doctrine did not apply.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. 453 A. 2d
489 (1982). It agreed with the trial court that the correct
question was whether the search "is a violation of privacy on
which the individual justifiably relied," id., at 493, and that
the search violated respondent's privacy. The court also
agreed that the "open fields" doctrine did not justify the
search. That doctrine applies, according to the court, only
when officers are lawfully present on property and observe
"open and patent" activity. ld., at 495. In this case, the
officers had trespassed upon defendant's property, and the
respondent had made every effort to conceal his activity.
We granted certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1983). 5
Judge Lively also wrote separately to argue that the open fields doctrine
applied only to lands that could be viewed by the public.
'The court also discredited other information, supplied by a confidential
informant, upon which the police had based their warrant application.
5
Respondent contends that the decision below rests upon adequate and
independent state law grounds. We do not read that decision, however,
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As the courts below recogriized; the touchstone of Fourth
Amendment analysis is the question whether a person has a
"constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy." Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., at 360 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). The Fourth Amendment does not protect the
merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only "those
expectations that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id., at 361. See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S.
735, 740-741 (1979).

A

No single factor determines whether an individual legitimately may claim under the Fourth Amendment that a place
should be free of government intrusion not authorized by
warrant. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 152-153
(1978) (POWELL, J., concurring) To discern whether a warrantless search is "reasonable," this Court has balanced society's interest in effective law enforcement against those prias excluding the evidence because the search violated the state constitution. The Maine Supreme Court referred only to the Fourth Amendment
of the federal Constitution and purported to apply the Katz test; the prior
state cases that the court cited also construed the federal Constitution. In
any case, the Maine Supreme Court did not articulate an independent state
ground with the clarity required by Michigan v. Long, - - U. S. - (1983).
Contrary to respondent's assertion, we do not review here the state
courts' finding as a matter of "fact" that the area searched was not an "open
field." Rather, the question before us is the appropriate legal standard for
determining whether search of that area without a warrant was lawful
under the federal Constitution.
The conflict between the two cases that we review here is illustrative of
the confusion the "open fields" doctrine has generated among the state and
federal courts. Compare, e. g., State v. Byers, 359 So. 2d 84 (La. 1978)
(refusing to apply open fields doctrine); State of Florida v. Brady, 406 So.
2d 1093 (Fla. 1981) (same), with United States v. Case, 669 F. 2d 46, 50-51
(CA2 1982); United States v. Freie, 545 F. 2d 1217 (CA9 1976); United
States v. Brown, 473 F . 2d 952, 954 (CA5 1973); Atwell v. United States,
414 F . 2d 136, 138 (CA5 1969).
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vacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. E. g.,
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654 (1979); United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 554-555 (1976). In assessing the degree to which a search infringes upon individual privacy, the Court has given weight to such factors as the
intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, e. g.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1977), the uses
to which the individual has put a location, e. g., Jones v.
United States, 362 U. S. 257, 265 (1960), and our societal understanding that certain areas, such as the home, deserve the
most scrupulous protection from government invasion,
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980).
In this light, the rule of Hester v. United States, supra, is
best understood as providing that an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of
doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding
the home. See also Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western
Alfalfa Corp., 416 U. S. 861, 865 (1974). We reaffirm that
rule today.
The rule accords well with the legitimate scope of individual privacy as expressed by the Framers in the language of
the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment indicates with
some precision the places and items encompassed by its protections. As Justice Holmes explained for the Court in his
characteristically laconic style: "[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open
fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as
old as the common law." Hester v. United States, 265 U. S.,
at 59. 6
8
In this respect, it is suggestive that John Madison's proposed draft of
what became the Fourth Amendment preserved "[t]he rights of the people
to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their other
property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures. . . ." See N.
Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution 100, n. 77 (1937) (emphasis added). Congress's
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The understanding of the right to privacy embodied in our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence confirms this interpretation of the Amendment's langtiage. The Amendment fosters
individual autonomy and relationships of trust such as friendship and family by establishing enclaves free from arbitrary
government interference. For example, the Court since the
enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed "the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic."
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 601. 7 See also
Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961);
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 293,
313 (1972).
The "open fields" doctrine is true to this conception of the
right to privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
For open fields do not generally provide the setting for those
intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter
from government interference or surveillance. There is no
societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities,

~d·tf,J

o+

C(lt)'~{.- ~ S~j'(ff(o.,
1

revisions of Madison's proposal broadened the scope of the Amendment in
some respects, id., at 100-103; however, the term "effects" is less inclusive
than "property" and cannot be said to encompass open fields.
This Court frequently has relied on the explicit language of the amendment as delineating the scope of its affirmative protections. See, e. g.,
Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 426 (1981) (opinion of Stewart, J.);
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 589--590; Alderman v. United States,
394 u. s. 165, 178-180 (1969).
7
The Fourth Amendment's protection of offices and commercial buildings is also based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the
history of the Amendment. The Fonrth ..\m.endment was prompted-inUwg-e measure by-the-pre-Revolutionaey abuses-of--gen~al wan:ants,-the
'~ffensiveness-[Gf--wftieh-}-was aentely felt by the merehants and
busi-FleSSffle&-whese-premises-and.-pl'
·
ttlianee
parliamefttaey-:reventle measw es that mest ilTitated-the.
arshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 311 (1978).f- -Inc
· .
light ofthese origjns, we held that thQ ban eft wanantless semches applies
tJJ eemme1 :cl.ID: ptetnise!t Id a.t..~ ll 3 ~ also G.M. Leasing Corp. v.

~al

United States , 429 U. S. 338, 355 (1977)

SL _
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such as the cultivaton of crops, that occur in open fields.
Further, as a practical matter these lands usually are accessible to the public and the police in ·ways that a home or commercial structure would not be. It is not generally true that
fences or no trespassing signs effectively bar the public from
viewing open fields in rural areas. And both petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton concede that the public and police lawfully may survey lands from the air. 8 For these reasons, the asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not
an expectation that "society recognizes as reasonable." 9
The historical underpinnings of the "open fields" doctrine
also demonstrate that the doctrine is consistent with respect
for "reasonable expectations of privacy." As Justice
Holmes, writing for the Court, observed in Hester v. United
States, 265 U. S., at 57, the common law distinguished "open
fields" from the "curtilage," the land immediately surrounding and associated with the home. See 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, at 225. The distinction implies that only the curtilage, not the neighboring "open fields," warrants the
Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the home. At
common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the
intimate activity associated with the "sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life." Boyd v. United States, 116
8
Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15, 58. See, e. g., United States v. Allen, 675 F.
2d 1373, 1380-1381 (CA9 1980); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp.
1078, 1081 (WD Mich. 1980). In practical terms, petitioner Oliver's and
respondent Thornton's analysis merely would require law enforcement officers to use aerial surveillance to gather the information necessary to obtain
a warrant or to justify warrantless entry onto the property. It is hard to
see how such a requirement would advance legitimate privacy interests.
9
The Fourth Amendment provides ample protection to activities in the
"open fields" that might implicate an individual's privacy. An individual
who enters a place defined to be "public" for Fourth Amendment analysis
does not lose all claims to privacy or personal security. Cf. Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 766-767 (1979) (BURGER, C. J ., concurring). For
example, the individual cannot be arrested without probable cause.
United States v. Watson , 423 U. S. 411 (1976).
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U. S. 616, 630 (1886). Thus, courts have extended Fourth
Amendment protection to the curtilage; and they have defined the curtilage, as did the common law, by reference to
the factors that determine whether an individual reasonably
may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home
will remain private. See, e. g., United States v. van Dyke,
643 F. 2d 992, 993-994 (CA4 1981); United States v. Williams, 581 F. 2d 451, 453 (CA5 1978); Care v. United States,
231 F. 2d 22, 25 (CAlO), cert. denied, 351 U. S. 932 (1956).
Conversely, the common law implies, as we reaffirm today,
that no expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open
fields.
We conclude, from the text of the Fourth Amendment and
from the historical and contemporary understanding of its
purposes, that an individual has no legitimate expectation
that open fields will remain free from warrantless intrusion
by government officers.
B
Petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton contend, to the
contrary, that the circumstances of a search sometimes may
indicate that reasonable expectations of privacy were violated; and that courts therefore should analyze these circumstances on a case-by-case basis. We do not agree with these
contentions.
The case-by-case approach does not provide a workable accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Under this
approach, police officers would have to guess before every
search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently
high, posted a sufficient number of warning signs, or located
contraband in an area sufficiently secluded to establish a
right of privacy. The lawfulness of a search would turn on
"[a] highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of
ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions .... " New York v. Belton,
453 U. S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting LaFave, "Case-By-Case
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Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 127, 142). This Court repeatedly has acknowledged the difficulties created for courts, police and citizens by an ad hoc, ·case-by-case definition of
Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in complex factual circumstances. See Belton, supra, at 458-460; Robbins
v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 430 (1981) (POWELL, J., concurring); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 213-214 (1979);
United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 235 (1973). The
ad hoc approach not only makes it difficult for the policeman
to discern the scope of his authority, Belton, 453 U. S., at
460; it also creates a danger that constitutional rights will be
arbitrarily and inequitably enforced. Cf. Smith v. Goguen,
415 u. s. 566, 572-573 (1974).

III
In any event, while the factors that petitioner Oliver and
respondent Thornton urge the courts to consider are relevant
to Fourth Amendment analysis in some contexts, we do not
agree that these factors can be decisive on the question
whether the search of an open field is reasonable. Initially,
we reject the suggestion that steps taken to protect privacy
establish that expectations of privacy in an open field are legitimate. It is true, of course, that petitioner Oliver andrespondent Thornton, in order to conceal their criminal activities, planted the marijuana upon secluded land and erected
fences and no trespassing signs around the property. And it
may be that because of such precautions, few members of the
public stumbled upon the marijuana crops seized by the police. Neither of these suppositions demonstrates, however,
that the expectation of privacy was legitimate in the sense required by the Fourth Amendment. The test of legitimacy is
not whether the individual choses to conceal the activity
whose privacy he asserts. 10 Rather, the correct inquiry is

°Certainly the Framers did not intend that the Fourth Amendment
should shelter criminal activity wherever persons with criminal intent
1
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whether a warrantless search infringes upon the societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment. As we have explained, we find no basis for concluding that a police inspection of "open fields" accomplishes such an infringement.
Nor is search of a field "unreasonable" in the constitutional
sense because that search is a trespass at common law. The
existence of a property right is but one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate. "'[T]he
premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited."' Katz,
389 U. S., at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294,
304 (1967)). "[E]ven a property interest in premises may
not be sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to particular items located on the premises
or activity conducted thereon." Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U. S., at 144 n. 12.
The common law may guide consideration of the reasonableness of a search by defining areas whose invasion by others is wrongful. I d., at 153 (POWELL, J., concurring). 11 The
law of trespass, however, forbids intrusions upon land that
the Fourth Amendment would not proscribe. For trespass
law extends to instances where the exercise of the right to
exclude vindicates no legitimate privacy interest. 12 It is parchoose to erect barriers and post no trespassing signs.
11
As noted above, the common law conception of the "curtilage" has
served this function.
12
The common law of trespass furthers a range of interests that have
nothing to do with privacy, such as the owner's interest in defeating claims
of prescription by asserting his own title. See, e. g., O.W. Holmes, The
Common Law, at 98-100, 244-246 (1881). Criminal laws against trespass
are prophylactic: they protect against intruders who poach, steal crops or
vandalize property. In this light, the primary function of fences and no
trespassing signs traditionally has been to permit application of the state
laws of criminal trespass, not to assert some general expectation of privacy. See, e. g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, §402.1.C (1983) (trespass to enter a place "which is posted ... in a manner reasonably likely to
come to the attention of intruders or which is fenced or otherwise enclosed
in a manner designed to exclude intruders"); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 511.070
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ticularly implausible to insist that any trespass upon an open
field is an unreasonable search when the reasonableness of
aerial surveillance, which accomplishes as great an intrusion
upon a landowner's privacy, is conceded. See note 9, supra.
Thus, in the case of open fields, the general rights of property
protected by the common law of trespass yield to society's interest in effective law enforcement.
IV
The disposition of the two cases before us follows readily
from basic principles. Oliver v. United States is affirmed;
Maine v. Thornton is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

(1975) (trespass to enter "upon premises as to which notice against trespass
is given by fencing or other enclosure").
Modern commentators have rationalized the broad common law protections by noting that anyone who wishes to use the property is free to bargain for the right to do so with the property owner. R, Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law 10-13, 21 (1973). From this perspective, any use of property unlicensed by the owner is presumptively unjustified. This economic
rationale of the common law of trespass confirms that the common law will
confer protections from intrusion far broader than those required by
Fourth Amendment interests.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The "open fields" doctrine, first enunciated by this Court in
Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 (1924), permits police
officers to enter and search a field without a warrant. We
granted certiorari in these cases to clarify confusion that has
arisen as to the continued vitality of the doctrine.
I

No. 82-15.

Acting on reports that marijuana was being
raised on the farm of petitioner Oliver, two narcotics agents
of the Kentucky State Police went to the farm to investigate. 1 Arriving at the farm, they drove past petitioner's
house to a locked gate with a "No Trespassing" sign. A footpath led around one side of the gate. The agents walked
' It is conceded that the police did not have a warrant authorizing the
search, that there was no probable cause for the search and that no exception to the warrant requirement is applicable.
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around the gate and along the road for several hundred
yards, passing a barn and a parked camper. At that point,
someone standing in front of'the camper shouted, "No hunting is allowed, come back here." The officers shouted back
that they were Kentucky State Police officers, but found no
one when they returned to the camper. The officers resumed their investigation of the farm and found a field of
marijuana over a mile from petitioner's home.
Petitioner was arrested and indicted for "manufactur[ing]"
a "controlled substance." 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1). After a
pretrial hearing, the District Court suppressed evidence of
the discovery of the marijuana fields. Applying Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967), the court found that
petitioner had a reasonable expectation that the fields would
remain private because petitioner "had done all that could be
expected of him to assert his privacy in the area of farm that
was searched." He had posted no trespassing signs at regular intervals and had locked the gate at the entrance to the
center of the farm. Pet. App., at 23-24. Further, the court
noted that the fields themselves are highly secluded: they are
bounded on all sides by woods, fences and embankments and
cannot be seen from any point of public access. The court
concluded that this was not an "open" field that invited casual
intrusion.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en bane,
reversed the district court. 686 F. 2d 356 (1982). 2 The
court concluded that Katz, upon which the District Court relied, had not impaired the vitality of the open fields doctrine
of Hester. Rather, the open fields doctrine was entirely
compatible with Katz's emphasis on privacy. The court reasoned that the "human relations that create the need for privacy do not ordinarily take place" in open fields, and that the
property owner's common law right to exclude trespassers is
insufficiently linked to privacy to warrant the Fourth
2
A panel of the Sixth Circuit had affirmed the suppression order. 657 F.
2d 85 (1981).

82-15 & 82-1273-0PINION

OLIVER v. UNITED STATES

3

Amendment's protection. Id., at 360. 3 We granted certiorari. - U . S . - (1983).
No. 82-1273. After receiving an anonymous tip that marijuana was being grown in the woods behind respondent
Thornton's residence, two police officers entered the woods
by a path between this residence and a neighboring house.
They followed a footpath through the woods until they
reached two marijuana patches fenced with chicken wire.
Later, the officers determined that the patches were on the
property of respondent, obtained a warrant to search the
property and seized the marijuana. On the basis of this evidence, respondent was arrested and indicted.
The trial court granted respondent's motion to suppress
the fruits of the second search. The warrant for this search
was premised on information that the police had obtained
during their previous warrantless search, that the court
found to be unreasonable. 4 "No Trespassing" signs and the
secluded location of the marijuana patches evinced a reasonable expectation of privacy. Therefore, the court held, the
"open fields" doctrine did not apply.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. 453 A. 2d
489 (1982). It agreed with the trial court that the correct
question was whether the search "is a violation of privacy on
which the individual justifiably relied," id., at 493, and that
the search violated respondent's privacy. The court also
agreed that the "open fields" doctrine did not justify the
search. That doctrine applies, according to the court, only
The four dissenting judges contended that the open fields doctrine did
not apply where, as in this case, "reasonable efforts have been made to exclude the public." 686 F. 2d, at 372. To that extent, the dissent considered that Katz v. United States, supra, implicitly had overruled previous
holdings of this Court. The dissent then concluded that petitioner had established a "reasonable expectation of privacy" under the Katz standard.
Judge Lively also wrote separately to argue that the open fields doctrine
applied only to lands that could be viewed by the public.
' The court also discredited other information, supplied by a confidential
informant, upon which the police had based their warrant application.
3
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when officers are lawfully present on property and observe
"open and patent" activity .. ld., at 495. In this case, the
officers had trespassed upon defendant's property, and the
respondent had made every effort to conceal his activity.
We granted certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1983). 5
II

As the courts below recognized, the touchstone of Fourth
Amendment analysis is the question whether a person has a
"constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy." Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., at 360 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). The Fourth Amendment does not protect the
merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only "those
expectations that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' !d., at 361. See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S.
735, 740-741 (1979).
5
Respondent contends that the decision below rests upon adequate and
independent state law grounds. We do not read that decision, however,
as excluding the evidence because the search violated the state constitution. The Maine Supreme Court referred only to the Fourth Amendment
of the federal Constitution and purported to apply the Katz test; the prior
state cases that the court cited also construed the federal Constitution. In
any case, the Maine Supreme Court did not articulate an independent state
ground with the clarity required by Michigan v. Long, - - U. S. - (1983).
Contrary to respondent's assertion, we do not review here the state
courts' finding as a matter of "fact" that the area searched was not an "open
field." Rather, the question before us is the appropriate legal standard for
determining whether search of that area without a warrant was lawful
under the federal Constitution.
The conflict between the two cases that we review here is illustrative of
the confusion the "open fields" doctrine has generated among the state and
federal courts. Compare, e. g., State v. Byers, 359 So. 2d 84 (La. 1978)
(refusing to apply open fields doctrine); State v. Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093
(Fla. 1981) (same), with United States v. Case, 669 F. 2d 46, 50-51 (CA2
1982); United States v. Freie, 545 F. 2d 1217 (CA9 1976); United States v.
Brown, 473 F. 2d 952, 954 (CA5 1973); Atwell v. United States, 414 F. 2d
136, 138 (CA5 1969).
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A

No single factor determines whether an individual legitimately may claim under the Fourth Amendment that a place
should be free of government intrusion not authorized by
warrant. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 152-153
(1978) (POWELL, J., concurring) To discern whether a warrantless search is "reasonable," this Court has balanced society's interest in effective law enforcement against those privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. E. g.,
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654 (1979); United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 554-555 (1976). In assessing the degree to which a search infringes upon individual privacy, the Court has given weight to such factors as the
intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, e. g.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1977), the uses
to which the individual has put a location, e. g., Jones v.
United States, 362 U. S. 257, 265 (1960), and our societal understanding that certain areas, such as the home, deserve the
most scrupulous protection from government invasion, e. g.,
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980).
In this light, the rule of Hester v. United States, supra, is
best understood as providing that an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of
doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding
the home. See also Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western
Alfalfa Corp., 416 U. S. 861, 865 (1974). We reaffirm that
rule today.
The rule accords well with the legitimate scope of individual privacy as expressed by the Framers in the language of
the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment indicates with
some precision the places and items encompassed by its protections. As Justice Holmes explained for the Court in his
characteristically laconic style: "[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'per-
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sons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open
fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as
old as the common law." Hester v. United States, 265 U. S.,
at 59. 6
The understanding of the right to privacy embodied in our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence confirms this interpretation of the Amendment's language. The Amendment fosters
individual autonomy and relationships of trust such as friendship and family by establishing enclaves free from arbitrary
government interference. For example, the Court since the
enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed "the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic."
Payton v. New York, supra, at 601. 7 See also Silverman v.
United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961); United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 293, 313 (1972).
The "open fields" doctrine is true to this conception of the
right to privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
For open fields do not generally provide the setting for those
• In this respect, it is suggestive that John Madison's proposed draft of
what became the Fourth Amendment preserved "[t]he rights of the people
to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their other
property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures. . .. " See N.
Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution 100, n. 77 (1937) (emphasis added). Congress's
revisions of Madison's proposal broadened the scope of the Amendment in
some respects, id., at 100-103; however, the term "effects" is less inclusive
than "property" and cannot be said to encompass open fields.
This Court frequently has relied on the explicit language of the amendment as delineating the scope of its affirmative protections. See, e. g.,
Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 426 (1981) (opinion of Stewart, J.);
Payton v. New York , 445 U. S., at 589--590; Alderman v. United States,
394 u. s. 165, 178-180 (1969).
7
The Fourth Amendment's protection of offices and commercial buildings, in which there may be legitimate expectations of privacy, is also
based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the
Amendment. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 311 (1978);
G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 355 (1977)
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intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter
from government .interference or surveillance. There is no
societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities,
such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields.
Further, as a practical matter these lands usually are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home or commercial structure would not be. It is not generally true that
fences or no trespassing signs effectively bar the public from
viewing open fields in rural areas. And both petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton concede that the public and police lawfully may survey lands from the air. 8 For these reasons, the asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not
an expectation that "society recognizes as reasonable." 9
The historical underpinnings of the "open fields" doctrine
also demonstrate that the doctrine is consistent with respect
for "reasonable expectations of privacy." As Justice
Holmes, writing for the Court, observed in Hester v. United
States, 265 U. S., at 57, the common law distinguished "open
fields" from the "curtilage," the land immediately surrounding and associated with the home. See 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *225. The distinction implies that only the curtilage, not the neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth
Amendment protections that attach to the home. At com8

Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15, 58. See, e. g., United States v. Allen, 675 F.
2d 1373, 1380-1381 (CA9 1980); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F . Supp.
1078, 1081 (WD Mich. 1980). In practical terms, petitioner Oliver's and
respondent Thornton's analysis merely would require law enforcement officers to use aerial surveillance to gather the information necessary to obtain
a warrant or to justify warrantless entry onto the property. It is hard to
see how such a requirement would advance legitimate privacy interests.
9
The Fourth Amendment provides ample protection to activities in the
open fields that might implicate an individual's privacy. An individual who
enters a place defined to be "public" for Fourth Amendment analysis does
not lose all claims to privacy or personal security. Cf. Arkansas v. Sanders , 442 U. S. 753, 766--767 (1979) (BURGER, C. J., concurring). For example, the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable arrest
or unreasonable seizure of effects upon the person remain fully applicable.
See, e. g., United States v. Watson, 423 U . S. 411 (1976).
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mon law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the "sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life." Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S.
616, 630 (1886). Thus, courts have extended Fourth Amendment protection to the curtilage; and they have defined the
curtilage, as did the common law, by reference to the factors
that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect
that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain
private. 10 See, e. g., United States v. van Dyke, 643 F. 2d
992, 993-994 (CA4 1981); United States v. Williams, 581
F. 2d 451, 453 (CA5 1978); Care v. United States, 231 F. 2d
22, 25 (CAIO), cert. denied, 351 U. S. 932 (1956). Conversely, the common law implies, as we reaffirm today, that
no expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open fields.
We conclude, from the text of the Fourth Amendment and
from the historical and contemporary understanding of its
purposes, that an individual has no legitimate expectation
that open fields will remain free from warrantless intrusion
by government officers.
B

Petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton contend, to the
contrary, that the circumstances of a search sometimes may
indicate that reasonable expectations of privacy were violated; and that courts therefore should analyze these circumstances on a case-by-case basis. We do not agree with these
contentions.
The case-by-case approach does not provide a workable accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Under this
approach, police officers would have to guess before every
search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently
high, posted a sufficient number of warning signs, or located
contraband in an area sufficiently secluded to establish a
10
Neither petitioner Oliver nor respondent Thornton has contended that
the property searched was within the curtilage, and we have no ocassion
here to consider the scope of this doctrine.
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right of privacy. The lawfulness of a search would turn on
"[a] highly sophisticated set Qf rules, qualified by all sorts of
ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions .... " New York v. Belton,
453 U. S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting LaFave, "Case-By-Case
Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 127, 142). This Court repeatedly has acknowledged the difficulties created for courts, police and citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of
Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in complex factual circumstances. See Belton, supra, at 458-460; Robbins
v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 430 (1981) (POWELL, J., concurring); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 213-214 (1979);
United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 235 (1973). The
ad hoc approach not only makes it difficult for the policeman
to discern the scope of his authority, Belton, supra, at 460; it
also creates a danger that constitutional rights will be arbitrarily and inequitably enforced. Cf. Smith v. Goguen, 415
u. s. 566, 572-573 (1974).

III
In any event, while the factors that petitioner Oliver and
respondent Thornton urge the courts to consider are relevant
to Fourth Amendment analysis in some contexts, we do not
agree that these factors can be decisive on the question
whether the search of an open field is reasonable. Initially,
we reject the suggestion that steps taken to protect privacy
establish that expectations of privacy in an open field are legitimate. It is true, of course, that petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton, in order to conceal their criminal activities, planted the marijuana upon secluded land and erected
fences and no trespassing signs around the property. And it
may be that because of such precautions, few members of the
public stumbled upon the marijuana crops seized by the police. Neither of these suppositions demonstrates, however,
that the expectation of privacy was legitimate in the sense re-
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quired by the Fourth Amendment. The test of legitimacy is
not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly "private" activity. 11 Rather, the correct inquiry is whether a
warrantless search infringes upon the societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment. As we have explained,
we find no basis for concluding that a police inspection of open
fields accomplishes such an infringement.
Nor is search of a field "unreasonable" in the constitutional
sense because that search is a trespass at common law. The
existence of a property right is but one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate. "'[T]he
premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited."' Katz,
389 U. S., at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294,
304 (1967)). "[E]ven a property interest in premises may
not be sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to particular items located on the premises
or activity conducted thereon." Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U. S., at 144 n. 12.
The common law may guide consideration of the reasonableness of a search by defining areas whose invasion by others is wrongful. I d., at 153 (POWELL, J., concurring). 12 The
law of trespass, however, forbids intrusions upon land that
the Fourth Amendment would not proscribe. For trespass
law extends to instances where the exercise of the right to
exclude vindicates no legitimate privacy interest. 13 It is par11
Certainly the Framers did not intend that the Fourth Amendment
should shelter criminal activity wherever persons with criminal intent
choose to erect barriers and post no trespassing signs.
12
As noted above, the common law conception of the "curtilage" has
served this function.
13
The common law of trespass furthers a range of interests that have
nothing to do with privacy, such as the owner's interest in defeating claims
of prescription by asserting his own title. See, e. g., 0 . W. Holmes, The
Common Law 98-100, 244-246 (1881). Criminal laws against trespass are
prophylactic: they protect against intruders who poach, steal crops or vandalize property. The primary function of fences and no trespassing signs

... t;.

82-15 & 82-1273-0PINION
OLIVER v. UNITED STATES

11

ticularly implausible to insist that any trespass upon an open
field is an unreasonable search when the reasonableness of
aerial surveillance, which acc'omplishes as great an intrusion
upon a landowner's privacy, is conceded. See note 9, supra.
Thus, in the case of open fields, the general rights of property
protected by the common law of trespass yield to society's interest in effective law enforcement.
IV
The disposition of the two cases before us follows readily
from basic principles. Oliver v. United States is affirmed;
Maine v. Thornton is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

traditionally has been to permit application of the state laws of criminal
trespass, not to assert some general expectation of privacy. See, e. g.,
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, §402.1.C (1983) (trespass to enter a place
"which is posted ... in a manner reasonably likely to come to the attention
of intruders or which is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed
to exclude intruders"); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 511.070 (1975) (trespass to enter
."upon premises as to which notice against trespass is given by fencing or
other enclosure").
Modern commentators have rationalized the broad common law protections by noting that anyone who wishes to use the property is free to bargain for the right to do so with the property owner. R. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law 10-13, 21 (1973). From this perspective, any use of property is presumptively unjustified if that use is unlicensed by the owner.
This economic rationale of the common law of trespass confirms that the
common law will confer protections from intrusion far broader than those
required by Fourth Amendment interests.
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JuSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The "open fields" doctrine, first enunciated by this Court in
Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 (1924), permits police
officers to enter and search a field without a warrant. We
granted certiorari in these cases to clarify confusion that has
arisen as to the continued vitality of the doctrine.
I
No. 82-15. Acting on reports that marijuana was being
raised on the farm of petitioner Oliver, two narcotics agents
of the Kentucky State Police went to the farm to investigate. 1 Arriving at the farm, they drove past petitioner's
house to a locked gate with a "No Trespassing" sign. A footpath led around one side of the gate. The agents walked
1
It is conceded that the police did not have a warrant authorizing the
search, that there was no probable cause for the search and that no exception to the warrant requirement is applicable.
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around the gate and along the road for several hundred
yards, passing a barn and a parked camper. At that point,
someone standing in front of' the camper shouted, "No hunting is allowed, come back here." The officers shouted back
that they were Kentucky State Police officers, but found no
one when they returned to the camper. The officers resumed their investigation of the farm and found a field of
marijuana over a mile from petitioner's home.
Petitioner was arrested and indicted for "manufactur[ing]"
a "controlled substance." 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1). After a
pretrial hearing, the District Court suppressed evidence of
the discovery of the marijuana fields. Applying Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967), the court found that
petitioner had a reasonable expectation that the fields would
remain private because petitioner "had done all that could be
expected of him to assert his privacy in the area of farm that
was searched." He had posted no trespassing signs at regular intervals and had locked the gate at the entrance to the
center of the farm. Pet. App., at 23-24. Further, the court
noted that the fields themselves are highly secluded: they are
bounded on all sides by woods, fences and embankments and
cannot be seen from any point of public access. The court
concluded that this was not an "open" field that invited casual
intrusion.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en bane,
reversed the district court. 686 F. 2d 356 (1982). 2 The
court concluded that Katz, upon which the District Court relied, had not impaired the vitality of the open fields doctrine
of Hester. Rather, the open fields doctrine was entirely
compatible with Katz's emphasis on privacy. The court reasoned that the "human relations that create the need for privacy do not ordinarily take place" in open fields, and that the
property owner's common law right to exclude trespassers is
insufficiently linked to privacy to warrant the Fourth
2
A panel of the Sixth Circuit had affirmed the suppression order. 657 F.
2d 85 (1981).
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Amendment's protection. Id., at 360. 3 We granted certiorari. --U.S.-- (1983).
No. 82-1273. After receiving an anonymous tip that marijuana was being grown in the woods behind respondent
Thornton's residence, two police officers entered the woods
by a path between this residence and a neighboring house.
They followed a footpath through the woods until they
reached two marijuana patches fenced with chicken wire.
Later, the officers determined that the patches were on the
property of respondent, obtained a warrant to search the
property and seized the marijuana. On the basis of this evidence, respondent was arrested and indicted.
The trial court granted respondent's motion to suppress
the fruits of the second search. The warrant for this search
was premised on information that the police had obtained
during their previous warrantless search, that the court
found to be unreasonable. 4 "No Trespassing" signs and the
secluded location of the marijuana patches evinced a reasonable expectation of privacy. Therefore, the court held, the
"open fields" doctrine did not apply.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. 453 A. 2d
489 (1982). It agreed with the trial court that the correct
question was whether the search "is a violation of privacy on
which the individual justifiably relied," id., at 493, and that
the search violated respondent's privacy. The court also
agreed that the "open fields" doctrine did not justify the
search. That doctrine applies, according to the court, only
3
The four dissenting judges contended that the open fields doctrine did
not apply where, as in this case, "reasonable efforts have been made to exclude the public." 686 F. 2d, at 372. To that extent, the dissent considered that Katz v. United States , supra, implicitly had overruled previous
holdings of this Court. The dissent then concluded that petitioner had established a "reasonable expectation of privacy" under the Katz standard.
Judge Lively also wrote separately to argue that the open fields doctrine
applied only to lands that could be viewed by the public.
'The court also discredited other information, supplied by a confidential
informant, upon which the police had based their warrant application .

•..
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when officers are lawfully present on property and observe
"open and patent" activity . . !d., at 495. In this case, the
officers had trespassed upon defendant's property, and the
respondent had made every effort to conceal his activity.
We granted certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1983). 5
II

As the courts below recognized, the touchstone of Fourth
Amendment analysis is the question whether a person has a
"constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy." Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., at 360 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). The Fourth Amendment does not protect the
merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only "those
expectations that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' !d., at 361. See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S.
735, 740-741 (1979).
5
Respondent contends that the decision below rests upon adequate and
independent state law grounds. We do not read that decision, however,
as excluding the evidence because the search violated the state constitution. The Maine Supreme Court referred only to the Fourth Amendment
of the federal Constitution and purported to apply the Katz test; the prior
state cases that the court cited also construed the federal Constitution. In
any case, the Maine Supreme Court did not articulate an independent state
ground with the clarity required by Michigan v. Long, - - U. S. - (1983).
Contrary to respondent's assertion, we do not review here the state
courts' finding as a matter of "fact" that the area searched was not an "open
field." Rather, the question before us is the appropriate legal standard for
determining whether search of that area without a warrant was lawful
under the federal Constitution.
The conflict between the two cases that we review here is illustrative of
the confusion the "open fields" doctrine has generated among the state and
federal courts. Compare, e. g., State v. Byers, 359 So. 2d 84 (La. 1978)
(refusing to apply open fields doctrine); State v. Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093
(Fla. 1981) (same), with United States v. Case , 669 F. 2d 46, 50-51 (CA2
1982); United States v. Freie, 545 F. 2d 1217 (CA9 1976); United States v.
Brown, 473 F. 2d 952, 954 (CA5 1973); Atwell v. United States, 414 F. 2d
136, 138 (CA5 1969).
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A

No single factor determines whether an individual legitimately may claim under the Fourth Amendment that a place
should be free of government intrusion not authorized by
warrant. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 152-153
(1978) (POWELL, J., concurring) To discern whether a warrantless search is "reasonable," this Court has balanced society's interest in effective law enforcement against those privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. E. g.,
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654 (1979); United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 554-555 (1976). In assessing the degree to which a search infringes upon individual privacy, the Court has given weight to such factors as the
intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, e. g.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 7--8 (1977), the uses
to which the individual has put a location, e. g., Jones v.
United States, 362 U. S. 257, 265 (1960), and our societal understanding that certain areas, such as the home, deserve the
most scrupulous protection from government invasion, e. g.,
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980).
In this light, the rule of Hester v. United States, supra, is
best understood as providing that an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of
doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding
the home. See also Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western
Alfalfa Corp., 416 U. S. 861, 865 (1974). We reaffirm that
rule today.
The rule accords well with the legitimate scope of individual privacy as expressed by the Framers in the language of
the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment indicates with
some precision the places and items encompassed by its protections. As Justice Holmes explained for the Court in his
characteristically laconic style: "[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'per-

·•···
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sons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open
fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as
old as the common law." Hester v. United States, 265 U. S.,
at 59. 6
The understanding of the right to privacy embodied in our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence confirms this interpretation of the Amendment's language. The Amendment fosters
individual autonomy and relationships of trust such as friendship and family by establishing enclaves free from arbitrary
government interference. For example, the Court since the
enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed "the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic."
Payton v. New York, supra, at 601. 7 See also Silverman v.
United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961); United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 293, 313 (1972).
The "open fields" doctrine is true to this conception of the
right to privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
For open fields do not generally provide the setting for those
6
In this respect, it is suggestive that
Madison's proposed draft of
what became the Fourth Amendment preserved "[t]he rights of the people
to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their other
property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures . . .. " See N.
Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution 100, n. 77 (1937) (emphasis added). Congress's
revisions of Madison's proposal broadened the scope of the Amendment in
some respects, id., at 100-103; however, the term "effects" is less inclusive
than "property" and cannot be said to encompass open fields.
This Court frequently has relied on the explicit language of the amendment as delineating the scope of its affirmative protections. See, e. g.,
Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 426 (1981) (opinion of Stewart, J.);
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 589-590; Alderman v. United States,
394 u. s. 165, 178-180 (1969).
7
The Fourth Amendment's protection of offices and commercial buildings, in which there may be legitimate expectations of privacy, is also
based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the
Amendment. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 311 (1978);
G. M . Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 355 (1977)
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intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter
from government interference or surveillance. There is no
societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities,
such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields.
Further, as a practical matter these lands usually are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home or commercial structure would not be. It is not generally true that
fences or no trespassing signs effectively bar the public from
viewing open fields in rural areas. And both petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton concede that the public and police lawfully may survey lands from the air. 8 For these reasons, the asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not
an expectation that "society recognizes as reasonable." 9
The historical underpinnings of the "open fields" doctrine
also demonstrate that the doctrine is consistent with respect
for "reasonable expectations of privacy." As Justice
Holmes, writing for the Court, observed in Hester v. United
States, 265 U. 8., at 57, the common law distinguished "open
fields" from the "curtilage," the land immediately surrounding and associated with the home. See 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *225. The distinction implies that only the curtilage, not the neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth
Amendment protections that attach to the home. At comTr. of Oral Arg. 14-15, 58. See, e. g., United States v. Allen, 675 F.
2d 1373, 1380-1381 (CA9 1980); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F . Supp.
1078, 1081 (WD Mich. 1980). In practical terms, petitioner Oliver's and
respondent Thornton's analysis merely would require law enforcement officers to use aerial surveillance to gather the information necessary to obtain
a warrant or to justify warrantless entry onto the property. It is hard to
see how such a requirement would advance legitimate privacy interests.
9
The Fourth Amendment provides ample protection to activities in the
open fields that might implicate an individual's privacy. An individual who
enters a place defined to be "public" for Fourth Amendment analysis does
not lose all claims to privacy or personal security. Cf. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 766-767 (1979) (BURGER, C. J ., concurring). For example, the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable arrest
or unreasonable seizure of effects upon the person remain fully applicable.
See, e. g., United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976).
8
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mon law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the "sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life." Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S.
616, 630 (1886). Thus, courts have extended Fourth Amendment protection to the curtilage; and they have defined the
curtilage, as did the common law, by reference to the factors
that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect
that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain
private. 10 See, e. g., United States v. van Dyke, 643 F. 2d
992, 993--994 (CA4 1981); United States v. Williams, 581
F. 2d 451, 453 (CA5 1978); Care v. United States, 231 F. 2d
22, 25 (CAlO), cert. denied, 351 U. S. 932 (1956). Conversely, the common law implies, as we reaffirm today, that
no expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open fields.
We conclude, from the text of the Fourth Amendment and
from the historical and contemporary understanding of its
purposes, that an individual has no legitimate expectation
that open fields will remain free from warrantless intrusion
by government officers.
B
Petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton contend, to the
contrary, that the circumstances of a search sometimes may
indicate that reasonable expectations of privacy were violated; and that courts therefore should analyze these circumstances on a case-by-case basis. We do not agree with these
contentions.
The case-by-case approach does not provide a workable accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Under this
approach, police officers would have to guess before every
search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently
high, posted a sufficient number of warning signs, or located
contraband i.n an area sufficiently secluded to establish a
10
Neither petitioner Oliver nor respondent Thornton has contended that
the property searched was within the curtilage, and we have no ocassion
here to consider the scope of this doctrine.
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right of privacy. The lawfulness of a search would turn on
"[a] highly sophisticated set Qf rules, qualified by all sorts of
ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions .... " New York v. Belton,
453 U. S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting LaFave, "Case-By-Case
Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 127, 142). This Court repeatedly has acknowledged the difficulties created for courts, police and citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of
Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in complex factual circumstances. See Belton, supra, at 458-460; Robbins
v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 430 (1981) (POWELL, J., concurring); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 213--214 (1979);
United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 235 (1973). The
ad hoc approach not only makes it difficult for the policeman
to discern the scope of his authority, Belton, supra, at 460; it
also creates a danger that constitutional rights will be arbitrarily and inequitably enforced. Cf. Smith v. Goguen, 415
u. s. 566, 572-573 (1974).

III
In any event, while the factors that petitioner Oliver and
respondent Thornton urge the courts to consider are relevant
to Fourth Amendment analysis in some contexts, we do not
agree that these factors can be decisive on the question
whether the search of an open field is reasonable ~..; Initially,
we reject the suggestion that steps taken to protect privacy
establish that expectations of privacy in an open field are legitimate. It is true, of course, that petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton, in order to conceal their criminal activities, planted the marijuana upon secluded land and erected
fences and no trespassing signs around the property. And it
may be that because of such precautions, few members of the
public stumbled upon the marijuana crops seized by the police. Neither of these suppositions demonstrates, however,
that the expectation of privacy was legitimate in the sense re-
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quired by the Fourth Amendment. The test of legitimacy is
not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly "private" activity. 11 Rather, the correct inquiry is whether a
warrantless search infringes upon the societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment. As we have explained,
we find no basis for concluding that a police inspection of open
fields accomplishes such an infringement.
Nor is search of a field "unreasonable" in the constitutional
sense because that search is a trespass at common law. The
existence of a property right is but one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate. "'[T]he
premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited."' Katz,
389 U. 8., at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294,
304 (1967)). "[E]ven a property interest in premises may
not be sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to particular items located on the premises
or activity conducted thereon." Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U. 8., at 144 n. 12.
The common law may guide consideration of the reasonableness of a search by defining areas whose invasion by others is wrongful. I d., at 153 (POWELL, J., concurring). 12 The
law of trespass, however, forbids intrusions upon land that
the Fourth Amendment would not proscribe. For trespass
law extends to instances where the exercise of the right to
exclude vindicates no legitimate privacy interest. 13 It is parCertainly the Framers did not intend that the Fourth A~endment
should shelter criminal activity wherever persons with criminal intent
choose to erect barriers and post no trespassing signs.
12
As noted above, the common law conception of the "curtilage" has
served this function.
13
The common law of trespass furthers a range of interests that have
nothing to do with privacy, such as the owner's interest in defeating claims
of prescription by asserting his own title. See, e. g., 0. W. Holmes, The
Common Law 98-100, 244-246 (1881). Criminal laws against trespass are
prophylactic: they protect against intruders who poach, steal crops or vandalize property. The primary function of fences and no trespassing signs
11
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ticularly implausible to insist that any trespass upon an open
field is an unreasonable search when the reasonableness of
aerial surveillance, which acc'omplishes as great an intrusion
upon a landowner's privacy, is conceded. See note 9, supra.
Thus, in the case of open fields, the general rights of property
protected by the common law of trespass yield to society's interest in effective law enforcement.
IV
The disposition of the two cases before us follows readily
from basic principles. Oliver v. United States is affirmed;
Maine v. Thornton is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

traditionally has been to permit application of the state laws of criminal
trespass, not to assert some general expectation of privacy. See, e. g.,
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, §402.1.C (1983) (trespass to enter a place
"which is posted . . . in a manner reasonably likely to come to the attention
of intruders or which is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed
to exclude intruders"); Ky. Rev. · Stat. § 511.070 (1975) (trespass to enter
"upon premises as to which notice against trespass is given by fencing or
other enclosure").
Modem commentators have rationalized the broad common law protections by noting that anyone who wishes to use the property is free to bargain for the right to do so with the property owner. R. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law 10-13, 21 (1973). From this perspective, any use of property is presumptively unjustified if that use is unlicensed by the owner.
This economic rationale of the common law of trespass confirms that the
common law will confer protections from intrusion far broader than those
required by Fourth Amendment interests.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the qourt.
The "open fields" doctrine, first enunciated by this Court in
Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 (1924), permits police
officers to enter and search a field without a warrant. We
granted certiorari in these cases to clarify confusion that has
arisen as to the continued vitality of the doctrine.
I
No. 82-15. Acting on reports that marijuana was being
raised on the farm of petitioner Oliver, two narcotics agents
of the Kentucky State Police went to the farm to investigate. 1 Arriving at the farm, they drove past petitioner's
house to a locked gate with a "No Trespassing" sign. A footpath led around one side of the gate. The agents walked
' It is conceded that the police did not have a warrant authorizing the
search, that there was no probable cause for the search and that no exception to the warrant requirement is applicable.
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around the gate and along the road for several hundred
yards, passing a barn and a parked camper. At that point,
someone standing in front of'the camper shouted, "No hunting is allowed, come back here." The officers shouted back
that they were Kentucky State Police officers, but found no
one when they returned to the camper. The officers resumed their investigation of the farm and found a field of
marijuana over a mile from petitioner's home.
Petitioner was arrested and indicted for "manufactur[ing]"
a "controlled substance." 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1). After a
pretrial hearing, the District Court suppressed evidence of
the discovery of the marijuana fields. Applying Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967), the court found that
petitioner had a reasonable expectation that the fields would
remain private because petitioner "had done all that could be
expected of him to assert his privacy in the area of farm that
was searched." He had posted no trespassing signs at regular intervals and had locked the gate at the entrance to the
center of the farm. Pet. App., at 23-24. Further, tali! eeal"t 7
noted that the fields themselves are highly secluded: they are ·
bounded on all sides by woods, fences and embankments and
cannot be seen from any point of public access. The court
concluded that this was not an "open" field that invited casual
intrusion.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en bane,
reversed the district court. 686 F. 2d 356 (1982). 2 The
court concluded that Katz, upon which the District Court relied, had not impaired the vitality of the open fields doctrine
of Hester. Rather, the open fields doctrine was entirely
compatible with Katz's emphasis on privacy. The court reasoned that the "human relations that create the need for privacy do not ordinarily take place" in open fields, and that the
property owner's common law right to exclude trespassers is
insufficiently linked to privacy to warrant the Fourth
' A panel of the Sixth Circuit had affirmed the suppression order. 657 F.
2d 85 (1981).

L.j--
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Amendment's protection. Id., at 360. 3 We granted certiorari. - U . S . - (1983)..
No. 82-1273. After receiving an anonymous tip that marijuana was being grown in the woods behind respondent
Thornton's residence, two police officers entered the woods
by a path between this residence and a neighboring house.
They followed a footpath through the woods until they
reached two marijuana patches fenced with chicken wire.
Later, the officers determined that the patches were on the
property of respondent, obtained a warrant to search the
property and seized the marijuana. On the basis of this evidence, respondent was arrested and indicted.
The trial court granted respondent's motion to suppress
the fruits of the second search. The warrant for this search
was premised on information that the police had obtained
during their previous warrantless search, that the court
found to be unreasonable. 4 "No Trespassing" signs and the
secluded location of the marijuana patches evinced a reasonable expectation of privacy. Therefore, the court held, the
"open fields" doctrine did not apply.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. 453 A. 2d
489 (1982). It agreed with the trial court that the correct
question was whether the search "is a violation of privacy on
which the individual justifiably relied," id., at 493, and that
the search violated respondent's privacy. The court also
· agreed that the "open fields" doctrine did not justify the
search. That doctrine applies, according to the court, only
3
The four dissenting judges contended that the open fields doctrine did
not apply where, as in this case, "reasonable efforts have been made to exclude the public." 686 F. 2d, at 372. To that extent, the dissent considered that Katz v. United States, supra, implicitly had overruled previous
holdings of this Court. The dissent then concluded that petitioner had established a "reasonable expectation of privacy" under the Katz standard.
Judge Lively also wrote separately to argue that the open fields doctrine
applied only to lands that could be viewed by the public.
' The court also discredited other information, supplied by a confidential
informant, upon which the police had based their warrant application.
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when officers are lawfully present on property and observe
"open and patent" activity . . !d., at 495. In this case, the
officers had trespassed upon defendant's property, and the
respondent had made every effort to conceal his activity.
We granted certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1983). 5
II

As the courts below recognized, the touchstone of Fourth
Amendment analysis is the question whether a person has a
"constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy." Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., at 360 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). The Fourth Amendment does not protect the
merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only "those
expectations that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' !d., at 361. See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S.
735, 740-741 (1979).
Respondent contends that the decision below rests upon adequate and
independent state law grounds. We do not read that decision, however,
as excluding the evidence because the search violated the state constitution. The Maine Supreme Court referred only to the Fourth Amendment
of the federal Constitution and purported to apply the Katz test; the prior
state cases that the court cited also construed the federal Constitution. In
any case, the Maine Supreme Court did not articulate an independent state
ground with the clarity required by Michigan v. Long, - - U. S. - (1983).
Contrary to respondent's assertion, we do not review here the state
courts' finding as a matter of "fact" that the area searched was not an "open
field." Rather, the question before us is the appropriate legal standard for
determining whether search of that area without a warrant was lawful
under the federal Constitution.
The conflict between the two cases that we review here is illustrative of
the confusion the "open fields" doctrine has generated among the state and
federal courts. Compare, e. g., State v. Byers, 359 So. 2d 84 (La. 1978)
(refusing to apply open fields doctrine); State v. Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093
(Fla. 1981) (same), with United States v. Case, 669 F. 2d 46, 50-51 (CA2
1982); United States v. Freie, 545 F. 2d 1217 (CA9 1976); United States v.
Broum, 473 F. 2d 952, 954 (CA5 1973); Atwell v. United States, 414 F . 2d
136, 138 (CA5 1969).
5
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A

No single factor determines whether an individual legitimately may claim under the Fourth Amendment that a place
should be free of government intrusion not authorized by
warrant. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 152-153
(1978) (POWELL, J., concurring) To discern whether a warrantless search is "reasonable," this Court has balanced society's interest in effective law enforcement against those privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. E. g.,
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654 (1979); United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 554-555 (1976). In assessing the degree to which a search infringes upon individual privacy, the Court has given weight to such factors as the
intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, e. g.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1977), the uses
to which the individual has put a location, e. g., Jones v.
United States, 362 U. S. 257, 265 (1960), and our societal understanding that certain areas, such as the home, deserve the
most scrupulous protection from government invasion, e. g.,
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980).
In this light, the rule of Hester v. United States, supra, is
best understood as providing that an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of
doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding
the home. See also Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western
Alfalfa Corp., 416 U. S. 861, 865 (1974). We reaffirm that
rule today.
The rule accords well with the legitimate scope of individual privacy as expressed by the Framers in the language of
the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment indicates with
some precision the places and items encompassed by its protections. As Justice Holmes explained for the Court in his
characteristically laconic style: "[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'per-

82-15 & 82-1273---0PINION
OLIVER v. UNITED STATES

6

sons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open
fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as
old as the common law." Hester v. United States, 265 U. S.,
at 59. 6
The understanding of the right to privacy embodied in our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence confirms this interpretation of the Amendment's language. The Amendment fosters
individual autonomy and relationships of trust such as friendship and family by establishing enclaves free from arbitrary
government interference. For example, the Court since the
enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed "the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic."
Payton v. New York, supra, at 601. 7 See also Silverman v.
United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961); United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 293, 313 (1972).
The "open fields" doctrine is true to this conception of the
right to privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
For open fields do not generally provide the setting for those

~-----u ()~
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In this respect, it is suggestive that
adison's proposed draft of
what became the Fourth Amendment preserved "[t]he rights of the people
to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their other
property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures .... " See N.
Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution 100, n. 77 (1937) (emphasis added). Congress's
revisions of Madison's proposal broadened the scope of the Amendment in
some respects, id., at 100-103; however, the term "effects" is less inclusive
than "property" and cannot be said to encompass open fields.
This Court frequently has relied on the explicit language of the amendment as delineating the scope of its affirmative protections. See, e. g.,
Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 426 (1981) (opinion of Stewart, J.);
Payton v. New York , 445 U. S., at 589--590; Alderman v. United States,
394 u. s. 165, 17~180 (1969).
7
The Fourth Amendment's protection of offices and commercial buildings, in which there may be legitimate expectations of privacy, is also
based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the
Amendment. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc ., 436 U. S. 307, 311 (1978);
G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 355 (1977)
6
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intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter
from government interference or surveillance. There is no
societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities,
such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields.
Further, as a practical matter these lands usually are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home or commercial structure would not be. It is not generally true that
fences or no trespassing signs effectively bar the public from
viewing open fields in rural areas. And both petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton concede that the public and police lawfully may survey lands from the air. 8 For these reasons, the asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not
an expectation that "society recognizes as reasonable." 9
The historical underpinnings of the "open fields" doctrine
also demonstrate that the doctrine is consistent with respect
for "reasonable expectations of privacy." As Justice
Holmes, writing for the Court, observed in Hester v. United
States, 265 U. 8., at 57, the common law distinguished "open
fields" from the "curtilage," the land immediately surrounding and associated with the home. See 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *225. The distinction implies that only the curtilage, not the neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth
Amendment protections that attach to the home. At com8

Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15, 58. See, e. g., United States v. Allen, 675 F.
2d 1373, 1380-1381 (CA9 1980); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp.
1078, 1081 (WD Mich. 1980). In practical terms, petitioner Oliver's and
respondent Thornton's analysis merely would require law enforcement officers to use aerial surveillance to gather the information necessary to obtain
a warrant or to justify warrantless entry onto the property. It is hard to
see how such a requirement would advance legitimate privacy interests.
9
The Fourth Amendment provides ample protection to activities in the
open fields that might implicate an individual's privacy. An individual who
enters a place defined to be "public" for Fourth Amendment analysis does
not lose all claims to privacy or personal security. Cf. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 766-767 (1979) (BURGER, C. J., concurring). For example, the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable arrest
or unreasonable seizure of effects upon the person remain fully applicable.
See, e. g., United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976).
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mon law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the "sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life." Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S.
616, 630 (1886). Thus, courts have extended Fourth Amendment protection to the curtilage; and they have defined the
curtilage, as did the common law, by reference to the factors
that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect
that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain
private. 10 See, e. g., United States v. van Dyke, 643 F. 2d
992, 993-994 (CA4 1981); United States v. Williams, 581
F. 2d 451, 453 (CA5 1978); Care v. United States, 231 F. 2d
22, 25 (CAlO), cert. denied, 351 U. S. 932 (1956). Conversely, the common law implies, as we reaffirm today, that
no expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open fields.
We conclude, from the text of the Fourth Amendment and
from the historical and contemporary understanding of its
purposes, that an individual has no legitimate expectation
that open fields will remain free from warrantless intrusion
by government officers.
B
Petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton contend, to the
contrary, that the circumstances of a search sometimes may
indicate that reasonable expectations of privacy were violated; and that courts therefore should analyze these circumstances on a case-by-case basis. We do not agree with these
contentions.
The case-by-case approach does not provide a workable accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Under this
approach, police officers would have to guess before every
search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently
high, posted a sufficient number of warning signs, or located
contraband in an area sufficiently secluded to establish a
10
Neither petitioner Oliver nor respondent Thornton has contended that
the property searched was within the curtilage, and we have no ocassion
here to consider the scope of this doctrine.
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right of privacy. The lawfulness of a search would turn on
"[a] highly sophisticated set Qf rules, qualified by all sorts of
ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions .... " New York v. Belton,
453 U. S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting LaFave, "Case-By-Case
Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 127, 142). This Court repeatedly has acknowledged the difficulties created for courts, police and citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of
Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in complex factual circumstances. See Belton, supra, at 458-460; Robbins
v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 430 (1981) (POWELL, J., concurring); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 213-214 (1979);
United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 235 (1973). The
ad hoc approach not only makes it difficult for the policeman
to discern the scope of his authority, Belton, supra, at 460; it
also creates a danger that constitutional rights will be arbitrarily and inequitably enforced. Cf. Smith v. Goguen, 415
u. s. 566, 572-573 (1974).

III
In any event, while the factors that petitioner Oliver and
respondent Thornton urge the courts to consider are relevant
to Fourth Amendment analysis in some contexts, we do not
agree that these factors can be decisive on the question
whether the search of an open field is reasonable. Initially,
we reject the suggestion that steps taken to protect privacy
establish that expectations of privacy in an open field are legitimate. It is true, of course, that petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton, in order to conceal their criminal activities, planted the marijuana upon secluded land and erected
fences and no trespassing signs around the property. And it
may be that because of such precautions, few members of the
public stumbled upon the marijuana crops seized by the police. Neither of these suppositions demonstrates, however,
that the expectation of privacy was legitimate in the sense re-
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quired by the Fourth Amendment. The test of legitimacy is
not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly "private" activityY Rather, the correct inquiry is whether a
warrantless search infringes upon the societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment. As we have explained,
we find no basis for concluding that a police inspection of open
fields accomplishes such an infringement.
Nor is search of a field "unreasonable" in the constitutional
sense because that search is a trespass at common law. The
existence of a property right is but one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate. "'[T]he
premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited."' Katz,
389 U. S., at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294,
304 (1967)). "[E]ven a property interest in premises may
not be sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to particular items located on the premises
or activity conducted thereon." Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U. S., at 144 n. 12.
The common law may guide consideration of the reasonableness of a search by defining areas whose invasion by others is wrongful. I d., at 153 (POWELL, J., concurring). 12 The
law of trespass, however, forbids intrusions upon land that
the Fourth Amendment would not proscribe. For trespass
law extends to instances where the exercise of the right to
exclude vindicates no legitimate privacy interest. 13 It is parCertainly the Framers did not intend that the Fourth Amendment
should shelter criminal activity wherever persons with criminal intent
choose to erect barriers and post no trespassing signs.
12
As noted above, the common law conception of the "curtilage" has
served this function.
13
The common law of trespass furthers a range of interests that have
nothing to do with privacy, such as the owner's interest in defeating claims
of prescription by asserting his own title. See, e. g., 0. W. Holmes, The
Common Law 98-100, 244-246 (1881). Criminal laws against trespass are
prophylactic: they protect against intruders who poach, steal crops or vandalize property. The primary function of fences and no trespassing signs
11
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ticularly implausible to insist that any trespass upon an open
field is an unreasonable search when the reasonableness of
aerial surveillance, which acc'omplishes as great an intrusion
upon a landowner's privacy, is conceded. See note 9, supra.
Thus, in the case of open fields, the general rights of property
protected by the common law of trespass yield to society's interest in effective law enforcement.
IV
The disposition of the two cases before us follows readily
from basic principles. Oliver v. United States is affirmed;
Maine v. Thornton is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

traditionally has been to permit application of the state laws of criminal
trespass, not to assert some general expectation of privacy. See, e. g.,
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, §402.1.C (1983) (trespass to enter a place
"which is posted . . . in a manner reasonably likely to come to the attention
of intruders or which is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed
to exclude intruders"); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 511.070 (1975) (trespass to enter
"upon premises as to which notice against trespass is given by fencing or
other enclosure").
Modern commentators have rationalized the broad common law protections by noting that anyone who wishes to use the property is free to bargain for the right to do so with the property owner. R. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law 10-13, 21 (1973). From this perspective, any use of property is presumptively unjustified if that use is unlicensed by the owner.
This economic rationale of the common law of trespass confirms that the
common law will confer protections from intrusion far broader than those
required by Fourth Amendment interests.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The "open fields" doctrine, first enunciated by this Court in
Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 (1924), permits police
officers to enter and search a field without a warrant. We
granted certiorari in these cases to clarify confusion that has
arisen as to the continued vitality of the doctrine.

I
No. 82-15. Acting on reports that marijuana was being
raised on the farm of petitioner Oliver, two narcotics agents
of the Kentucky State Police went to the farm to investigate. 1 Arriving at the farm, they drove past petitioner's
house to a locked gate with a "No Trespassing" sign. A footpath led around one side of the gate. The agents walked
' It is conceded that the police did not have a warrant authorizing the
search, that there was no probable cause for the search and that no exception to the warrant requirement is applicable.
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around the gate and along the road for several hundred
yards, passing a barn and a parked camper. At that point,
someone standing in front of the camper shouted, "No hunting is allowed, come back here." The officers shouted back
that they were Kentucky State Police officers, but found no
one when they returned to the camper. The officers resumed their investigation of the farm and found a field of
marijuana over a mile from petitioner's home.
Petitioner was arrested and indicted for "manufactur[ing]"
a "controlled substance." 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1). After a
pretrial hearing, the District Court suppressed evidence of
the discovery of the marijuana fields. Applying Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967), the court found that
petitioner had a reasonable expectation that the fields would
remain private because petitioner "had done all that could be
expected of him to assert his privacy in the area of farm that
was searched." He had posted no trespassing signs at regular intervals and had locked the gate at the entrance to the
center of the farm. Pet. App., at 2~24. Further, the court
noted that the fields themselves are highly secluded: they are
bounded on all sides by woods, fences and embankments and
cannot be seen from any point of public access. The court
concluded that this was not an "open" field that invited casual
intrusion.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en bane,
reversed the district court. 686 F. 2d 356 (1982). 2 The
court concluded that Katz, upon which the District Court relied, had not impaired the vitality of the open fields doctrine
of Hester. Rather, the open fields doctrine was entirely
compatible with Katz's emphasis on privacy. The court reasoned that the "human relations that create the need for privacy do not ordinarily take place" in open fields, and that the
property owner's common law right to exclude trespassers is
insufficiently linked to privacy to warrant the Fourth
2
A panel of the Sixth Circuit had affirmed the suppression order. 657 F.
2d 85 (1981).
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Amendment's protection. Id., at 360. 3 We granted certiorari. U. S. (1983).
No. 82-1273. After receiving an anonymous tip that marijuana was being grown in the woods behind respondent
Thornton's residence, two police officers entered the woods
by a path between this residence and a neighboring house.
They followed a footpath through the woods until they
reached two marijuana patches fenced with chicken wire.
Later, the officers determined that the patches were on the
property of respondent, obtained a warrant to search the
property and seized the marijuana. On the basis of this evidence, respondent was arrested and indicted.
The trial court granted respondent's motion to suppress
the fruits of the second search. The warrant for this search
was premised on information that the police had obtained
during their previous warrantless search, that the court
found to be unreasonable. 4 "No Trespassing" signs and the
secluded location of the marijuana patches evinced a reasonable expectation of privacy. Therefore, the court held, the
"open fields" doctrine did not apply.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. 453 A. 2d
489 (1982). It agreed with the trial court that the correct
question was whether the search "is a violation of privacy on
which the individual justifiably relied," id., at 493, and that
the search violated respondent's privacy. The court also
agreed that the "open fields" doctrine did not justify the
search. That doctrine applies, according to the court, only
3
The four dissenting judges contended that the open fields doctrine did
not apply where, as in this case, "reasonable efforts have been made to exclude the public." 686 F. 2d, at 372. To that extent, the dissent considered that Katz v. United States, supra, implicitly had overruled previous
holdings of this Court. The dissent then concluded that petitioner had established a "reasonable expectation of privacy" under the Katz standard.
Judge Lively also wrote separately to argue that the open fields doctrine
applied only to lands that could be viewed by the public.
'The court also discredited other information, supplied by a confidential
informant, upon which the police had based their warrant application.
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when officers are lawfully present on property and observe
"open and patent" activity. ld., at 495. In this case, the
officers had trespassed upon defendant's property, and the
respondent had made every effort to conceal his activity.
We granted certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1983). 5
II
The rule announced in Hester v. United States was founded
upon the explicit language of the Fourth Amendment. That
Amendment indicates with some precision the places and
things encompassed by its protections. As Justice Holmes
explained for the Court in his characteristically laconic style:
"[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment
to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is
not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the
latter and the house is as old as the common law." Hester v.
United States, 265 U. S., at 59. 6

l

6
Respondent contends that the decision below rests upon adequate and
independent state law grounds. We do not read that decision, however,
as excluding the evidence because the search violated the state constitution. The Maine Supreme Court referred only to the Fourth Amendment
of the federal Constitution and purported to apply the Katz test; the prior
state cases that the court cited also construed the federal Constitution. In
any case, the Maine Supreme Court did not articulate an independent state
ground with the clarity required by Michigan v. Long, - - U. S. - (1983).
Contrary to respondent's assertion, we do not review here the state
courts' finding as a matter of "fact" that the area searched was not an "open
field." Rather, the question before us is the appropriate legal standard for
determining whether search of that area without a warrant was lawful
under the federal Constitution.
The conflict between the two cases that we review here is illustrative of
the confusion the "open fields" doctrine has generated among the state and
federal courts. Compare, e. g., State v. Byers, 359 So. 2d 84 (La. 1978)
(refusing to apply open fields doctrine); State v. Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093
(Fla. 1981) (same), with United States v. Lace, 669 F. 2d 46, 50-51 (CA2
1982); United States v. Freie, 545 F. 2d 1217 (CA9 1976); United States v.
Brown, 473 F. 2d 952, 954 (CA5 1973); Atwell v. United States, 414 F. 2d
136, 138 (CA5 1969).
"The dissent offers no basis for its suggestion that Hester rests upon
some narrow, unarticulated principle rather than upon the reasoning enun-
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Nor are the open fields "effects" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. In this respect, it is suggestive that
James Madison's proposed draft of what became the Fourth
Amendment preserves "[t]he rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their
other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures. . . ." See N. Lasson, The History and Development
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
100, n. 77 (1937). Although Congress' revisions of Madison's
proposal broadened the scope of the Amendment in some respects, id., at 100-103, the term "effects" is less inclusive
than "property" and cannot be said to encompass open
fields. 7 We conclude, as did the Court in deciding Hester v.
United States, that the government's intrusion upon the open
fields is not one of those "unreasonable searches" proscribed
by the text of the Fourth Amendment.

III
This interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's language is
consistent with the understanding of the right to privacy exciated by the Court's opinion in that case. Nor have subsequent cases discredited Hester's reasoning. This Court frequently has relied on the explicit language of the Fourth Amendment as delineating the scope of its
affirmative protections. See, e. g., Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420,
426 (1981) (opinion of Stewart, J.); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at
58~90; Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 17~180 (1969).
As
these cases, decided after Katz, indicate, Katz's "reasonable expectation of
privacy" standard did not sever Fourth Amendment doctrine from the
Amendment's language. Katz itself construed the Amendment's protection of the person against unreasonable searches to encompass electronic
eavesdropping of telephone conversations sought to be kept private; and
Katz's fundamental recognition that "the Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches and seizures,"
see 389 U. S., at 353, is faithful to the Amendment's language. As Katz
demonstrates, the Court fairly may respect the constraints of the Constitution's language without wedding itself to a unreasoning literalism. In contrast, the dissent's approach would ignor the language of the Constitution
itself as well as overturn this Court's governing precedent.
7
The Framers would have understood the term "effects" to be limited
to personal, rather than real, property. See generally, Doe v. Dring, 2M.

I
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pressed in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Since
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), the touchstone of
Amendment analysis has been the question whether a person
has a "constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy." 389 U. S., at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). The
Amendment does not protect the merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only "those expectations that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' Id., at 361. See
also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740-741 (1979).
A

No single factor determines whether an individual legitimately may claim under the Fourth Amendment that a place
should be free of government intrusion not authorized by
warrant. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 152-153
(1978) (POWELL, J., concurring). In assessing the degree to
which a search infringes upon individual privacy, the Court
has given weight to such factors as the intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, e. g. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1977), the uses to which the individual
has put a location, e. g., Jones v. United States, 362 U. S.
257, 265 (1960), and our societal understanding that certain
areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from government invasion, e. g., Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573
(1980). These factors are equally relevant to determining
whether the government's intrusion upon open fields without
a warrant or probable cause violates reasonable expectations
of privacy and is therefore a search proscribed by the
Amendment.
In this light, the rule of Hester v. United States, supra,
that we reaffirm today, may be understood as providing that
an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area imme& S. 448, 454 (1814) (discussing prior cases); 2 Blackstone,
ies 16, 384-385.
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diately surrounding the home. See also Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U. S. 861, 865 (1974).
This rule is true to the conception of the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment reflects
the recognition of the Founders that certain enclaves should
be free from arbitrary government interference. For example, the Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment
has stressed "the overriding respect for the sanctity of the
home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic." Payton v. New York, supra, at 601. 8
See also Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511
(1961); United States v. United States District Court, 407
u. s. 293, 313 (1972).
In contrast, open fields do not provide the setting for those
intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter
from government interference or surveillance. There is no
societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities,
such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields.
Moreover, as a practical matter these lands usually are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home, an office or commercial structure would not be. It is not generally true that fences or no trespassing signs effectively bar
the public from viewing open fields in rural areas. And both
petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton concede that the
public and police lawfully may survey lands from the air. 9
The Fourth Amendment's protection of offices and commercial buildings, in which there may be legitimate expectations of privacy, is also
based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the
Amendment. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 311 (1978);
G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 355 (1977)
9
Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15, 58. See, e. g., United States v. Allen, 675 F.
2d 1373, 1380-1381 (CA9 1980); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp.
1078, 1081 (WD Mich. 1980). In practical terms, petitioner Oliver's and
respondent Thornton's analysis merely would require law enforcement officers, in most situations, to use aerial surveillance to gather the information
necessary to obtain a warrant or to justify warrantless entry onto the prop8
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For these reasons, the asserted expectation of privacy in
open fields is not an expectation that "society recognizes as
reasonable." 10
The historical underpinnings of the "open fields" doctrine
also demonstrate that the doctrine is consistent with respect
for "reasonable expectations of privacy." As Justice
Holmes, writing for the Court, observed in Hester, 265
U. S., at 57, the common law distinguished "open fields"
from the "curtilage," the land immediately surrounding and
associated with the home. See 4 Blackstone, Commentaries
*225. The distinction implies that only the curtilage, not the
neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth Amendment
protections that attach to the home. At common law, the
curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity
associated with the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life," Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886),
and therefore has been considered part of home itself for
Fourth Amendment purposes. Thus, courts have extended
Fourth Amendment protection to the curtilage; and they
have defined the curtilage, as did the common law, by refererty. It is not easy to see how such a requirement would advance legitimate privacy interests.
10
The dissent conceives of open fields as bustling with private activity as
diverse as lovers' trysts and worship services. Post, at 8-9. But in most
instances police will disturb no one when they enter upon open fields.
These fields, by their very character as open and unoccupied, are unlikely
to provide the setting for activities whose privacy is sought to be protected
by the Fourth Amendment. One need think only of the vast expanse of
some western ranches or of the undeveloped woods of the Northwest to see
the unreality of the dissent's conception. Further, the Fourth Amendment provides ample protection to activities in the open fields that might
implicate an individual's privacy. An individual who enters a place defined
to be "public" for Fourth Amendment analysis does not lose all claims to
privacy or personal security. Cf. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753,
76&-767 (1979) (BURGER, C. J., concurring). For example, the Fourth
Amendment's protections against unreasonable arrest or unreasonable seizure of effects upon the person remain fully applicable. See, e. g., United
States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976).
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ence to the factors that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the
home will remain private. See, e. g., United States v. van
Dyke, 643 F. 2d 992, 993-994 (CA4 1981); United States v.
Williams, 581 F. 2d 451, 453 (CA5 1978); Care v. United
States, 231 F. 2d 22, 25 (CAlO), cert. denied, 351 U. S. 932
(1956). Conversely, the common law implies, as we reaffirm
today, that no expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to
open fields. 11
We conclude, from the text of the Fourth Amendment and
from the historical and contemporary understanding of its
purposes, that an individual has no legitimate expectation
that open fields will remain free from warrantless intrusion
by government officers.
B

Petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton contend, to the
contrary, that the circumstances of a search sometimes may
indicate that reasonable expectations of privacy were violated; and that courts therefore should analyze these circumstances on a case-by-case basis. The language of the Fourth
Amendment itself answers their contention.
Nor would a case-by-case approach provide a workable accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Under this
approach, police officers would have to guess before every
Neither petitioner Oliver nor respondent Thornton has contended that
the property searched was within the curtilage. Nor is it necessary in this
case to consider the scope of the curtilage exception to the open fields doctrine or the degree of Fourth Amendment protection afforded the curtilage, as opposed to the home itself. It is clear, however, that the term
"open fields" may include any unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of
the curtilage. An open field need be neither "open" nor a "field" as those
terms are used in common speech. For example, contrary to respondent
Thornton's suggestion, Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-22, a thickly wooded area nonetheless may be an open field as that term is used in construing the Fourth
Amendment. See, e. g., United States v. Pruitt, 464 F . 2d 494 (CA9
1972); Bedell v. State, 257 Ark. 895, 521 S. W. 2d 200 (1975).
11
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search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently
high, posted a sufficient number of warning signs, or located
contraband in an area sufficiently secluded to establish a
right of privacy. The lawfulness of a search would turn on
"[a] highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of
ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions .... " New York v. Belton,
453 U. S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting LaFave, "Case-By-Case
Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 127, 142). This Court repeatedly has acknowledged the difficulties created for courts, police and citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of
Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in differing factual circumstances. See Belton, supra, at 458-460; Robbins
v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 430 (1981) (POWELL, J., concurring); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 213-214 (1979);
United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 235 (1973). The
ad hoc approach not only makes it difficult for the policeman
to discern the scope of his authority, Belton, supra, at 460; it
also creates a danger that constitutional rights will be arbitrarily and inequitably enforced. Cf. Smith v. Goguen, 415
566, 572-573 (1974). 12

u. s.

IV
In any event, while the factors that petitioner Oliver and
respondent Thornton urge the courts to consider may be rele12
The clarity of the open fields doctrine that we reaffirm today is not
sacrificed, as the dissent suggests, by our recognition that the curtilage remains within the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Most of the
many millions of acres that are "open fields" are not close to any structure
and so not arguably within the curtilage. And, for most homes, the
boundaries of the curtilage will be clearly marked; and the conception defining the curtilage-as the area around the home to which the activity of
home life extends-is a familiar one easily understood from our daily experience. The occasional difficulties that courts might have in applying
this, like other, legal concepts, do not argue for the unprecedented expansion of the Fourth Amendment advocated by the dissent.
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vant to Fourth Amendment analysis in some contexts, these
factors cannot be decisive on the question whether the search
of an open field is subject to the Amendment. Initially, we
reject the suggestion that steps taken to protect privacy establish that expectations of privacy in an open field are legitimate.. It is true, of course, that petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton, in order to conceal their criminal
activities, planted the marijuana upon secluded land and
erected fences and no trespassing signs around the property.
And it may be that because of such precautions, few members of the public stumbled upon the marijuana crops seized
by the police. Neither of these suppositions demonstrates,
however, that the expectation of privacy was legitimate in
the sense required by the Fourth Amendment. The test of
legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal
assertedly "private" activity. 13 Rather, the correct inquiry
is whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment. As we have explained, we find no basis for concluding
that a police inspection of open fields accomplishes such an
infringement.
Nor is the government's intrusion upon an open field a
"search" in the constitutional sense because that intrusion is
a trespass at common law. The existence of a property right
is but one element in determining whether expectations of
privacy are legitimate. "'[T]he premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize
has been discredited."' Katz, 389 U. S., at 353 (quoting
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 304 (1967)). "[E]ven a
property interest in premises may not be sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to particular items located on the premises or activity conducted
thereon." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S., at 144 n. 12.
Certainly the Framers did not intend that the Fourth Amendment
should shelter criminal activity wherever persons with criminal intent
choose to erect barriers and post no trespassing signs.
13
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The common law may guide consideration of what areas
are protected by the Fourth Amendment search by defining
areas whose invasion by others is wrongful. I d., at 153
(POWELL, J., concurring). 14 The law of trespass, however,
forbids intrusions upon land that the Fourth Amendment
would not proscribe. For trespass law extends to instances
where the exercise of the right to exclude vindicates no legitimate privacy interest. 15 Thus, in the case of open fields, the
general rights of property protected by the common law of
trespass have little or no relevance to the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment.

v

We conclude that the open fields doctrine, as enunciated in
Hester, is consistent with the plain language of the Fourth
Amendment and its historical purposes. Moreover, Justice
Holmes' interpretation of the Amendment in Hester accords
with the "reasonable expectation of privacy" analysis developed in subsequent decisions of this Court. We therefore affirm Oliver v. United States; Maine v. Thornton is reversed
14
As noted above, the common law conception of the "curtilage" has
served this function.
15
The law of trespass recognizes the interest in possession and control of
one's property and for that reason permits exclusion of unwanted intruders. But it does not follow that the right to exclude conferred by trespass
law embodies a privacy interest also protected by the Fourth Amendment.
To the contrary, the common law of trespass furthers a range of interests
that have nothing to do with privacy and that would not be served by applying the strictures of trespass law to public officers. Criminal laws
against trespass are prophylactic: they protect against intruders who
poach, steal livestock and crops or vandalize property. And the civil action of trespass serves the important function of authorizing an owner to
defeat claims of prescription by asserting his own title. See, e. g., O.W.
Holmes, The Common Law, at 98-100, 244-246. In any event, unlicensed
use of property by others is presumptively unjustified, as anyone who
wishes to use the property is free to bargain for the right to do so with the
property owner, cf. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, at pp. 10-13, 21
(1973). For these reasons, the law of trespass confers protections from
intrusion by others far broader than those required by Fourth Amendment
interests.
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and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.

